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ABSTRACT 
BRIGER, LILLY Engaging China in the Twenty-First Century: An Analysis of U.S.-
China Relations and Recommendations for the Future 
 
In this thesis, I explore the fragile political relationship between China and the 
United States. In the past decade, an intensifying level of competition between the two 
powers is advancing the perception amongst a growing number of Americans that China 
will one day emerge as a future adversary that will draw the U.S into a strategic rivalry 
and possible security conflict. The purpose of my thesis is to determine the type of 
“threat” China presents to the United States, and based on this assessment determine 
which policies would best increase the possibility for collaboration while limiting the 
potential for future rivalry between the two powers.  
I used theories of structural realism to explain the developing power 
dynamic between China and the United States. I argue against the claims 
stipulated by proponents of this theory who maintain that a security conflict or 
strategic rivalry between China and the U.S. is inevitable. Moreover, I also refute 
the claim that China seeks to grow powerful enough to overturn the existing order. 
Instead, I take the position that based on China’s international behavior it can be 
deemed a “rational power” that acts in accordance with its own self-interests. It 
would be contrary to China’s interests to precipitate a security conflict with the 
United States over Taiwan because, in the same way the U.S. is economically 
dependent on China, China is heavily reliant on access to U.S. markets to sustain 
its current growth levels. From my research, I concluded as China emerges as a 
global power, the challenges it presents to the U.S. are tempered with greater 
 ii
opportunities for collaboration, reaching beyond commercial interests extending to 
diplomatic and security matters. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Introduction: China versus U.S.A? 
 
At the turn of the nineteenth century, virtually no one could have predicted the 
accuracy of Napoleon’s foresight when he observed, “Let China sleep, for when she 
wakes, she will shake the world.”1 Yet, in the present state of affairs, it is impossible to 
ignore the reality of this statement. China’s titanic rise has dominated these early years of 
the twenty-first century. Fueled by the world’s fastest growing economy, with an average 
annual growth rate of 9.5% for the past three decades, China is rapidly emerging as a 
major economic power in the ever changing structure of the global community. It has 
become an attractive business environment for U.S. and multinational corporations. As a 
result, foreigners invested more money in developing businesses in China in 2003 than in 
any other part of the world.2 Accordingly, “China continues to grow at unparalleled rates 
because the world continues to feed it.”3
                                                 
1 Kynge, James. China Shakes the World: A Titan’s Rise and Troubled Future—and the 
Challenge for America. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2006. Pp. xiv 
2 Fishman, Ted C. China Inc.: How the Rise of the Next Superpower Challenges America 
and the World. New York: Scribner, 2006. P. 15 
3 Ibid 
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China’s newfound economic prowess, which manifested itself in the form of 
approximately $1 trillion of foreign exchange reserves at the end of 2006, has also aided 
its transformation into a major geopolitical power. China’s vast wealth, coupled with its 
insatiable appetite for finite sources of energy and other resources has established a new 
assertiveness in Chinese foreign policy that in many ways challenges the preeminence of 
the U.S. in international relations. Moreover, in the last few years, the intensifying level 
of economic competition between these two giants has exacerbated the ideological and 
cultural differences that have existed between the two since Nixon’s opening of China in 
1972.  
During a period in which: U.S. unemployment has been on the rise; wages have 
stagnated; and the strong possibility of recession looms over the U.S. economy, the 
average American is slowly remembering that China is an authoritarian state, ruled by a 
Communist Party that rejects the liberal democratic ideals of governance embraced by the 
U.S. When these factors are combined with the media’s incessant portrayal of China “as 
an ominous threat before which the west must change or wilt” they contribute to an 
exaggerated and miscalculated fear of the “rising Chinese tiger” and the threat it presents 
to the United States.4 This thesis takes the position that such flawed misperceptions, in 
both public opinion and policy circles, endanger the development of sound policies that 
can effectively deal with the challenges to the United States presented by China’s rise.  
 In the coming years, no relationship will be more important than that between 
China and the United States. In The Economist’s special edition The World in 2008, the 
editor Daniel Franklin comments in his opening letter that “America and China will be 
                                                 
4 Hutton, Will. Hutton,Will. The Writing on the Wall: Why We Must Embrace 
China as a Partner or Face It as an Enemy. New York: Free Press, 2006. P. 6 
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[the] prime players in the matters that will concentrate minds around the world in 2008”.5 
One area that will surely draw attention is the economic relationship between these two 
powerhouses and its impact on the world economy. A second area is the more subtle 
diplomatic and security relationship between the two, which, after the fall of the Soviet 
Union, often operates in the shadows of the first. In this thesis, the principal focus is upon 
the latter area.  However, I maintain that the economic issues and diplomatic and security 
issues that exist between China and the United States are not mutually exclusive and, 
therefore, cannot be strictly separated into economic and political disputes.  
In chapter three, I illustrate this point in greater detail when examining the effects 
of China’s economic rise on its political relationship with the U.S. I evaluate the increase 
of China’s geopolitical influence relative to the declining one of the U.S.  This threatens 
to upset the delicate balance between competition and collaboration, which serves as the 
foundation of this relationship. On the other hand, however, it can be effectively argued 
that the U.S. is facing many similar challenges from other countries, namely India and a 
resurgent Russia, given their competing interests regarding both commerce and security 
matters.  
In accordance with the existing literature on the topic, this thesis considers 
the rise of China, in many ways, to be synonymous with the overall trend of 
globalization. Therefore, the challenges China now presents to the United States 
are consistent with those of this powerful, and seemingly unstoppable, force. In 
the last several decades, the so-called “great powers” of the twentieth century, that 
                                                 
5 Franklin, Daniel. "From the Editor, The World in 2008." The Economist: The 
World in 2008 Special ed. 2007: 13. 
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is the U.S, Japan and Europe, have, to a large extent, lost their productive edge, a 
central quality to any state seeking to preserve a position of preeminence in 
geopolitics, to the so-called BRICS—Brazil, Russia, India, and China.6 The irony 
in this transitional trend cannot be ignored. It was the very system of global 
liberalism, set in place by the U.S. in accord with other Western powers that has 
facilitated the economic booms experienced by these newly emerging market 
economies. In the aftermath of WWII, the U.S. sought to create a world capitalist 
system that would favor and protect the dominant position of the U.S. in 
international relations. Yet, in hindsight it is evident that such a system is, in fact, 
favorable to those nations entering it later because of their ability to build on the 
advances of their predecessors. In this sense, it can be said that global liberalism is 
much like the Greek heroes of antiquity in that both are endowed with a tragic 
flaw that is ultimately responsible for their own demise. 
This concept is supported by the stipulations of Immanuel Wallerstein’s 
theory of The Three Instances of Hegemony in the History of the Capitalist World-
Economy. He argues that global liberalism perpetuates the downfall of the very 
powers that set it in place.7 This results from the fact that it becomes more difficult 
to impede the spread of technological expertise as the system grows to include 
new economies. As a result, it is inevitable that, over time, the nations that enter 
                                                 
6 Pesek, William. “Viewpoint: Building bricks – Lessons for India and Brazil”. 
International Herald Tribune; Sec: Marketplace by Bloomberg. December 10, 2006. 
7 Wallerstein, Immanuel. “The Three Instances of Hegemony in the History of the 
Capitalist World Economy”. International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 24 (1983) 
p. 101  
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the system later achieve greater results because they come in at a time when the 
markets are most profitable and the technology at their disposal is more advanced. 
The consequence, Wallerstein then goes on to say, is that these newly integrated 
economies begin to "eat away" at the material base of the existing powers’ 
productive capacity and thus gain a greater competitive advantage.  Ultimately, the 
BRIC economies have replicated and innovated the existing economic models. 
Their developing economies allow them to exploit cheap labor to increase their 
productive capacity, while the price of labor steadily increases in the developed 
nations and production rates fall. Additionally, the developing economies are 
exonerated from meeting the standards placed upon more advanced nations 
because of their “developing status”, contributing to their leveraged position. 
Cheap labor and a high level of productivity give these emerging market countries 
a significant competitive advantage that threatens the economic superiority of the 
existing powers. 
 
ARGUMENT 
Although the United States faces challenges from all these developing 
economies, in this thesis I argue that none of these challenges are more daunting 
then those presented by China. For example, India and Brazil are, to a significant 
extent, in a strategic alliance with Washington and their economic success has 
been accompanied by democratic transitions that are favorable to a U.S. led world 
order. Yet, China’s remarkable transformation into a capitalist economy, which in 
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many ways, outcompetes that of the U.S., was facilitated under an authoritarian 
state ruled by a single Communist party.8 Even more troubling is that the level of 
economic growth China has experienced which, under other circumstances, should 
have been the breeding ground for democratic transitions. Instead this has served 
only to further ingrain and legitimize the system of autocratic Communist rule. 
Furthermore, as China increasingly moves its industrial sector into areas of high 
technology, no longer restricting itself to the production of low cost goods, the 
intensity of its competition with the United States increases. As a result, by the 
sheer virtue of its size and its advanced technological capabilities, China is now 
perceived as a “peer competitor” or “near peer competitor” within a growing 
number of U.S. government circles. Accordingly, this perception advances the 
image of China as a potential strategic rival to the United States.  
In this thesis, I maintain that such premature judgments of China’s 
capabilities threaten the future stability of U.S.-Chinese relations. Although 
American politicians are aware of the need to collaborate constructively with 
China, in a democracy such as our own, it often tends to be the case that emotion 
rules over objectivity. When this reality is taken against a growing desire amongst 
American politicians since 9/11 to appear “tough” to its constituents on issues of 
                                                 
8 Azar, Gat. “The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers”. Foreign Affairs Jul/Aug 2007; 
Vol. 86, Is. 4 (2007). 
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national security, it increases the risk of the kind of misperceptions, in our 
relationship with China that could lead to military confrontation.9
The chapters ahead explore the fragile political relationship in the past four 
decades between China and the United States, beginning with its inception in 1972 and 
then carrying on to the present day. For almost four decades, in spite of the tremendous 
ideological and cultural differences that exist between the two, the U.S. and China have 
been able to avoid painting one another as adversaries. In part, this results from the fact 
that China has been a substantially weaker than the U.S. and has not been in a position to 
challenge the unilateralist policies of the U.S., both in this bilateral relationship and in the 
rest of the world.  Thus, for the past three and a half decades, the balance of power in this 
relationship has been significantly tilted in Washington’s favor. 
The State Department website boasts that the practice of engagement has 
characterized U.S.-China policy for the past thirty-five years. The rationale for engaging 
China derives from the broad conclusions that motivated Nixon to reach out to the PRC 
in 1972 in hopes of balancing the power of the Soviet Union.10 From this view, 
engagement has been justified on the grounds that it is more beneficial to the 
advancement of U.S. national interests and, to a lesser degree, global stability, than 
perpetually isolating China. In practice, engagement seeks to sustain and increase 
relations with China by enhancing dialogue and integrating the country into the 
institutions and organizations of the international system. To a large extent, engagement 
                                                 
9 Shirk, Susan L. China: Fragile Superpower. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
P. 10 
10 Hills, Carla A. et al., “U.S.-China Relations: An Affirmative Agenda, A Responsible 
Course” Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force Report 
No. 59 (New York, New York; The Council on Foreign Relations, 2007) Stable URL:  
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has been the cornerstone of U.S. policy both economically and diplomatically. Currently, 
China is a member of an array of international security organizations.11 The purpose of 
engagement is to increase collaboration, while keeping disputes in areas of diverging 
opinions and competing interests at a minimum. However, the rise of China challenges 
the U.S. modus operandi of engagement in many ways.   
These challenges arise from certain assumptions that have dictated the pattern of 
engagement since1972. The idea of engaging China, which effectively reversed the prior 
two decades of U.S. foreign policy, was partially grounded in Nixon’s early logic that it 
was best to improve relations with China while it was still a substantially weaker power 
so that its interests could be shaped in ways conducive to those of the United States. At 
the time, this meant using China to balance the power of the Soviet Union.  This concept 
was the foundation for the U.S. engagement policy with China. This thesis maintains that 
the U.S. practice of engagement operates on two critical assumptions, namely, that China 
is a) the weaker power; and b) its interests can be shaped in ways desired by the U.S. 
Therefore, “engagement” tends to provide the appearance of a mutually beneficial 
relationship, while it, nevertheless, greatly distorts the balance of power in the favor of 
the U.S. In the past, when the United States was the dominant world power, this was a 
sound policy model. In recent years, however, the rise of China as not only a strong 
economic power, but also a viable military power in Asia,undermines both of these 
assumptions. Accordingly, as China’s capabilities are enhanced as a result of its 
economic success, these outdated perceptions of China’s power challenge the U.S.’s 
conventional approach to this bilateral relationship.  
                                                 
11 A list of these organizations is reflected in Appendix I 
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In response to China’s increased capabilities, U.S. policymakers have reverted to 
repeating what Harry Harding calls a cycle of euphoria and disillusionment in this 
complicated relationship.12 The consequence is an overwhelming tendency in U.S. policy 
circles grossly to exaggerate and overestimate the capabilities and objectives of those 
perceived to be “peer” or “near peer” competitors. Harding asserts that the U.S. is often 
culpable of perceiving China in terms that are far too simplistic and emotional, painting 
an image of it as either an ally or adversary.13
This compulsion to define our relations with China in such rigid terms contributes 
to an inconsistency in the U.S.’s application of engagement. This thesis grounds the 
growing fear in this country that soon China will be powerful enough to change the rules 
of the current international system better to serve its own interests against the theoretical 
claims of structural realism for the purpose of my analysis. Recently, the argument that 
engagement does not sufficiently protect the U.S.’s position in this event has been 
gaining growing popularity in the United States. However, the high level of 
interdependency between our two economies eliminates the possibility of completely 
abandoning this approach in pursuit of a more confrontational policy of containment. The 
highly emotional debate surrounding the “China threat” obstructs the formulation of 
articulate policies that would seek to navigate a middle ground.  
Despite these concerns, in many ways, however, U.S.-Chinese relations are better 
than they were during the tumultuous period 1990’s, following the events in Tiananmen 
Square and the fall of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, there are early warning signs, 
                                                 
12 Harding, Harry. A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China since 1972. 
Washington, D.C: The Brookings Institution, 1992. 361 
13 Ibid 360-1 
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which are discussed in chapter three, endorsing the perception that a future strategic 
rivalry may well develop between China and the U.S. To deter this possibility, the Bush 
Administration has called on China to become a “responsible stakeholder” in 
international affairs and promised to cooperate towards achieving this end, noting that 
inevitably countries would “hedge” against the risk that China will emerge as a future 
belligerent.14
The argument in this thesis is that, if China is to become a more “responsible 
partner” in international affairs, U.S. engagement needs to be become more balanced, or 
at least uphold an appearance of equality and partnership in areas of collaboration. 
Continuing to address these concerns unilaterally and outside the peripheries of 
established multilateral institutions will harm the stability of this relationship, while 
doing little to protect the U.S. against a possibly adversarial China. The current unilateral 
and, at times confrontational, method of “hedging” the risk that China may emerge as a 
future adversary is self-defeating. It advances the type of misperceptions that increase the 
risk of war amongst states. This was most recently reflected in the Bush Administration’s 
attempt to secure a military agreement with India. Such styles of “hedging”, namely 
bilateral military alliances falling outside the scope of both the established international 
institutions and international law, only provokes greater hostility on the part of China’s 
leadership and its highly nationalistic citizens.15 The Chinese are well aware of the on-
going and, at times, hostile debate within the U.S. about how to accommodate China’s 
                                                 
14 Bader, Jeffrey A. et al. 2007. “Contending with the Rise of China: Build on Three Decades of Progress”. 
Opportunity 08: A Project o the Brookings Institution (pp.1-15). Washington, D.C: The Brookings 
Institution. Stable URL: P. 5 
 
15 This is a reference to the U.S.’s attempt to deepen its bilateral military alliance with 
India by overriding the established international rules set forth on nuclear proliferation. 
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rise. All of these anxieties are intensified by China’s deep-seated nationalism and historic 
suspicion of foreigners, especially of Western powers.16
Ultimately, if the goal is to ensure China’s lasting commitment to the current 
international system, the U.S. must seek to engage China in a manner that strengthens the 
institutions of the current international order. Engaging China in the twenty-first century 
requires that U.S. policy makers take into account the recent decline of the U.S.’s global 
authority and economic superiority and the limitations this reality poses on policies that 
seek unilaterally to influence China’s behavior. Thus, the U.S. must seek to settle our 
disputes with China and voice our opposition to its policies or behavior within the 
established multilateral institution of which we are both members when it is possible.  
When these issues fall outside the scope of such institutions, it is necessary that 
we voice our concerns or demands in coalition with our allies, such as the E.U. to 
strengthen both the legitimacy of our claims and increase the chances that they will be 
met. This will avoid creating an adversarial dynamic that pins the U.S. directly against 
China. The United States and China must actively work to avoid this scenario not only 
for the sake of their own relations, but also to maintain the stability of global system. As 
a result of the size and interdependencies of the U.S. and Chinese economies with each 
                                                 
16 Hutton 60: This type of xenophobia in China dates back to what is known as the 
“Century of Humiliation”. The beginning of this period can trace its origins to 1842, 
when the treaty of Nanjing was signed. It stipulated that the Chinese would cede Hong 
Kong to Britain. Following this concession, no fewer than twenty-six treaties were 
drafted, delivering a row of crushing territorial defeats to the Chinese at the hands of 
foreign powers. The entire Chinese coast was opened up to foreigners on terms that 
grossly disadvantaged China, while enhancing the prosperity and wealth of European and 
Japanese powers. Since the onset of the Communist Revolution in 1949, China’s 
communist party has disseminated propaganda promising a reversal of this humiliation 
and a restoration of China’s greatness amongst the international powers. It continues to 
promote a type of nationalism that is highly suspicious of foreign powers, especially 
those of the West and Japan by invoking this historical fear (Hutton, Will).  
 11
other and the global community, any diplomatic strains that disrupt the flow of trade and 
commercial exchanges between them could undermine and even create havoc with the 
global economy as a whole. 
It would, however, be entirely too idealistic and naïve to assume that this course 
of action will always be possible. Inevitably, there will be instances that the U.S. will 
have to act unilaterally to protect its own interests when there is a clear and present 
danger to its national security, as any state would in such a precarious situation.  On the 
other hand, using the latter as a general framework to guide our exchanges with China 
will limit the possibility that such moments will escalate tensions to levels that would 
destabilize the course of our bilateral relations. Contrary to the Bush Administration’s 
beliefs, an emphasis on multilateralism is not an admission of weakness or defeat. Rather, 
the two pronged policy of: 1) recognizing the limitations of our power; and 2) 
formulating policies accordingly will shield this nation from the type of zealous 
overextensions of authority that have precipitated the decline of great empires and 
hegemonies throughout history.  
CHAPTER OVERVIEW: 
Chapter 2 
 Chapter two is dedicated to a historical analysis of Nixon and Kissinger’s opening 
of China. The goal of this chapter is to illustrate the origins of engagement policy and, by 
doing so, to isolate its central components. I will outline the primary motivations that led 
Nixon to approach China, as well as the necessary steps taken by both Nixon and 
Kissinger to ensure the success of this rapprochement. In 1972, the opening of China was 
ultimately successful on the part of the U.S. first because of Nixon’s tremendous 
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foresight that no world system could effectively operate with China isolated on its 
outskirts. Second, Henry Kissinger correctly assumed that security, not ideology, was the 
most important of China’s national interests. By reconfiguring the Chinese threat, 
Kissinger and Nixon were able to open a dialogue that had been closed for far too long 
because of a miscalculated perception of China’s objectives and capabilities. The 
culmination of these efforts, resulting in Nixon’s trip to China, was reflected in the 
Shanghai Communiqué. The primary function of this document was to outline areas of 
common interests, while recognizing the existence of strong divergent opinions, 
especially over the issue of Taiwan. Chapter two also provides a brief summary of the 
normalization of U.S.-Chinese relations, with a particular emphasis on the issue of 
Taiwan. It will set up the dissenting opinions that continue to surround the present debate 
over Taiwan’s future political status. In this chapter, important connections between the 
past and present are made, thus providing lessons for future diplomatic exchanges 
between China and the U.S. 
 
Chapter 3 
 Chapter 3 demonstrates how the recent rise of China complicates the foundation, 
set forth by Nixon and Kissinger, for U.S. engagement policy. In 2008, China and the 
U.S. continue to share many of the same differences that they did in 1972, with new 
discrepancies over such issues as human rights, trade, and currency valuation added to 
the list. An increased level of competition between the China and the U.S. has also 
contributed to upsetting the delicate balance in this political relationship. Several factors 
have been responsible for exaggerating the competitive elements of this power dynamic. 
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The first two are linked to China’s growing necessity for, consumption of, energy and 
other natural resources. China is now the world’s second largest consumer of petroleum, 
behind the United States.  Its consumption of petroleum is continuing to grow at an 
alarming rate. With supply lines limited, the Chinese government is forced to seek new 
sources that directly challenge the United States in two ways. First, it has gained market 
share of sources of supply that are considered strategic U.S. suppliers of petroleum, such 
as Venezuela. This type of action only contributes to the image of China as an ominous 
competitor that threatens U.S. integral sources of energy supply and, in turn, upsets the 
U.S. economy. Second, China’s need for oil has motivated it to seek close ties with 
countries that are generally considered hostile enemies of the U.S. For example, China’s 
relationship with Iran and the Sudanese government complicates the possibility of 
diplomatic collaboration on issue of nuclear proliferation in Iran and peace keeping 
coalitions and human rights in Darfur. 
 Essentially, this chapter outlines the reasons contributing to the realistic 
perception that China may one day emerge as a future rival of the U.S. that inevitably 
may result in a security conflict. This Chapter will outline the growing area of tensions 
between the two powers over issues of competition for natural resources, trade, finance, 
human rights, nuclear proliferation, non-military intervention, as well as Taiwan and 
China’s military modernization.  
Chapter 4 
 Chapter four provides an overview and critical analysis of existing 
recommendations for the future of U.S./Chinese relations. It first compares and contrasts 
the rise of China presented in chapter three against the current realities of China’s 
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domestic and international experience, which, pose certain limitations on its behavior. 
This chapter exploresthe reasons for which, I maintain, support the conclusion that a 
security conflict between China and the United States is unlikely in the foreseeable 
future. Instead, the chapter sets out the position for the necessity of policies that would 
limit the possibility of a Cold War type strategic rivalry between the U.S. and China. Set 
against this backdrop, the chapter concludes with an array of recommendations to 
improve relations in the areas of outstanding disputes presented in chapter three. 
Chapter 5 
I conclude with a brief analysis concerning the broader implication for the U.S.’s 
shifting position in the global community outlined in its bilateral relations with China. 
Namely, I identify a change in the landscape of global politics that renders the current 
U.S. approach to foreign policy somewhat outdated and ineffective to deal with the 
challenges of the twenty-first century.  
 
PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE 
 
 In the arena of international relations, it is not solely the emergence of a new 
power that contributes to the mitigating structure of the system, but more importantly it is 
the reactions of the existing powers to this development that redefines the system. 
Therefore, the way in which the United States responds to the challenges presented by 
China’s rise will be just as significant, perhaps even more so, than the rise of China itself, 
in setting the course for this young century. For these reasons, it is critical that the U.S. 
moves actively to construct a diplomatic approach that engages China on a more equal 
level within the established institutions of the international system. These newfound 
responsibilities inevitability are likely to lead to greater accountability on the part of the 
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Chinese for their behavior in international relations. China’s participation in the global 
financial system will not yield these results on its own.  
Moreover, while, in the present state of affairs, China has strong incentives to 
cooperate and remain a relatively benign power because of the tremendous benefits it 
gains from the global economy, this may not always be the case. The recent volatility in 
the international markets proves that stability of this system is not guaranteed. An Asian 
financial crisis at the scale of the ongoing one in the U.S. could have disastrous results for 
U.S.-Chinese relations. It would be wise, therefore, for the U.S. to strengthen the existing 
system while it still can do so to ensure that China will have no other option but 
responsibly to engage and participate in accordance with the current standards.17 These 
ideas will be further explored in the chapters that follow.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: 
                                                 
17 Ikenberry, G. John. "The Rise of China and the Future of the West; Can the 
Liberal System Survive?” Foreign Affairs Jan/Feb 2008 87. 1 (2008), p. 23 (1-5 
online). 
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 Historical Analysis of the U.S. 
Rapprochement with China 1969-
1972: Setting the Tone for a future 
Policy of “Engagement” 
 
 
 
 
We have at times in the past been enemies. We have great differences today. What brings us together is 
that we have common interests which transcend those differences. As we discuss our differences, neither 
of us will compromise our principles. But while we cannot close the gulf between us, we can try to bridge 
it so we may be able to talk across it.18
 
Richard Nixon 1972 
 
 
 It is a rare occasion in history when an event is able to convey the magnitude of 
its significance at the time it unfolds.  On February 21, 1972, when President Richard M. 
Nixon set foot on Chinese soil, the world stood by and consciously watched history in the 
making. Nixon’s trip symbolized a dramatic reversal in U.S. foreign policy. It ended 
nearly twenty years of estrangement between the two nations, which began in 1949, when 
the Communists seized power in Beijing and the U.S. chose to recognize Chiang Kai-
shek’s ROC government in Taiwan as the sole legitimate rulers of China. This chapter 
examines the historical foundations of U.S. engagement policy through an analysis of 
Nixon and Kissinger’s opening of China.  
 When Nixon, joined by Kissinger as his national security advisor, took office, 
both men believed U.S. foreign policy had fallen in a state of crisis. The Vietnam War 
was squandering the country’s geopolitical resources. During a decade in which tensions 
                                                 
18 Nixon, Richard M. The Memoirs of Richard Nixon. New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 
1978. p. 565 
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between the Soviet Union and the U.S. had reached its zenith, the Soviet Union had 
achieved nuclear parity with the United States. Nixon and Kissinger believed an 
emboldened USSR, combined with the spread of Communism in many parts of Asia, 
presented a significant threat to U.S. global interests and security.  
As strong adherents to the philosophy of realpolitik, they saw that nothing less 
than the power of the United States was at stake in this crisis.19 According to this school 
of thought, power is the most vital aspect of national interests in international relations. 
From this theoretical viewpoint the security of a nation is dependent upon the 
preservation of its power, and thus policies must be drafted to promote and protect this 
vital resource. In previous administrations during the Cold War, the U.S. maintained its 
power balance with the Soviet Union by allocating tremendous funds to the advancement 
of military technology, especially nuclear weapons. Yet, a decline in America’s global 
economic position eliminated the possibility of regaining strategic superiority through the 
proliferation of more weapons. The costs of funding the Vietnam War had led the U.S. to 
run its first bilateral trade deficit with Japan in the postwar period.20 Militarily containing 
the Soviet Union was draining the U.S. economy. Consequently, Nixon and Kissinger 
were motivated to explore new alliances that might bolster their diplomatic leverage over 
Moscow.  
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 In the opening months of his presidency, Nixon decided that rapprochement with 
China would best advance the strategic national interests of the United States. He 
believed a relationship with China would give the U.S. a strategic advantage over the 
USSR, and to a lesser degree it could be useful in terminating America’s involvement in 
Vietnam. But in 1969, few could have predicted the fortitude with which Richard Nixon 
would pursue an opening to China, given his reputation as a ferocious anti-communist. 
However, above any ideological convictions, Nixon was a realist. He understood that the 
integration of China into the global community was inevitable. But more importantly, it 
was imperative for the stability of the international structure. In February of 1970, Nixon 
publicly presented his intentions to improve ties with China in his first foreign policy 
report to Congress.  
The Chinese are a great and vital people who should not remain isolated from the 
global community. United States Policy is not likely soon to have much impact on 
China’s behavior, let alone its ideological outlook. But it is certainly in our interest, 
and in the interest of peace and stability in Asia and the world, that we take what 
steps we can toward improved practical relations with Peking…We will seek to 
promote understandings which can establish a new pattern of mutually beneficial 
actions.21
 
His arguments here were reminiscent of similar ideas he had outlined in an article 
entitled, “Asia after Vietnam”, which appeared in the 1967 issue of Foreign Affairs. He 
understood that the realities of the international structure would eventually force the U.S. 
to engage with China. He concluded it was better to dictate the terms of engagement 
while China was the relatively weaker power and the United States could use an alliance 
with it to further U.S. strategic interests.  Ultimately, Nixon, who was later joined by 
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Kissinger on this view, believed that improved ties with China would accelerate the pace 
of strategic arms negotiations with the Soviet Union.22
 Thus on the part of the United States, the motivations for engaging with China 
were twofold. First, it provided a significant strategic advantage for the U.S. over the 
Soviet Union in the power politics that dominated the Cold War. This was the primary 
concern driving the strategy. A second reason was the idea that the United States could 
benefit from the exchange of culture, ideas, and markets with China. Similar 
considerations led the Chinese to reach the same conclusion. 
 In China, fears of the Japanese, but primarily Soviet military expansionism 
prompted the Mao and Zhou to take the bait offered by the U.S. Furthermore, the Cultural 
Revolution had ravished the economic infrastructure of the country. Although Mao and 
Zhou were not entirely prepared to abandon the principles of the Revolution, they 
understood that the only way for China to become a geopolitical force, a so called “great 
power”, was through a process of economic and technological modernization.23 For this 
to take place, it was necessary for China to abandon its isolationist policy and seek 
venues that would allow for its integration into the global community. Developing a 
relationship with the United States presented itself as the most viable catalyst for securing 
these ends. America was the gateway to the West, and ultimately modernity. This 
process, however, would not be completed until Deng Xiaoping’s regime was in power 
during the 1980’s after he moved to fully normalize diplomatic relations with the U.S. 
during the Carter Administration in 1979.At the time Nixon moved to reconcile relations, 
                                                 
22 Kolodziej, Edward A. “Foreign Policy and the Politics of Interdependence”. Polity,Vol. 
9, No. 2. (Winter, 1976), pp. 121-157. 
23 Harding, Harry. A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China since 1972. 
Washington, D.C: The Brookings Institution, 1992. P.  4 
 20
the benefits of establishing cultural and economic ties with China were also becoming 
increasingly clear in the United States. Regaining access to the Chinese market was 
advantageous to American business. In 1946, at its height, the Chinese market accounted 
for 5 percent of total American exports.24
 These two common interests, first, a short term goal of deterring the threat of 
Soviet expansion, and the second, a long term goal of bringing the United States and 
China closer together culturally and economically, provided the foundation for 
engagement and collaboration.25 Nevertheless, at the time of Nixon’s visit, China and the 
United States remained deeply divided by ideology and culture. Bridging this gap 
presented a significant challenge. The divergent opinions concerning the Taiwan issue 
threatened to override any possibility for cooperation in the stated areas. Consequently, in 
order to ensure the success of rapprochement and the future normalization of relations, 
Nixon and Kissinger had to persuade Mao and Zhou of the necessity for collaboration in 
spite of disagreements, such as Taiwan, that could not be immediately resolved. 
Nixon and Kissinger accomplished this end by exaggerating the importance of the 
common interests upon which the two countries could develop a relationship. Ultimately, 
the success of Nixon and Kissinger’s diplomacy was grounded a realistic reassessment of 
Chinese objectives and capabilities. Under Nixon’s guidance, Kissinger began to 
extensively research China. Motivated by the theoretical implications of structural 
realism, Kissinger concluded that it was the security threat presented by the Soviets, and 
not a solution to the political future of Taiwan, that was China’s primary concern. 
Pursuant to this analysis, Kissinger believed that for the Chinese, finding a strategy to 
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contain Soviet expansionism would override any ideological concerns, such as the 
political future of Taiwan. After his secret trip, it was clear that a heightened security 
threat to the Chinese would dilute any possibility of the Taiwan issue blocking a 
breakthrough in relations. The Taiwan issue, however, would require significant 
concessions on the part of the U.S. before a breakthrough in relations could occur. This 
point will be addressed in a latter section. The key facet of the American diplomacy, 
which secured the opening of China, was a balance of exaggerating a Soviet military 
threat, while quickly pacifying any anxieties on the part of the Chinese that emanated 
from their historic suspicions of Western betrayal with reassurances of U.S. friendship. 
Although the second interest of bringing China and the U.S. closer together 
remained important to developing relations, the primary motivation for engagement, on 
both ends, was a common opposition to the USSR. In the short run, exaggerating the 
Soviet threat was beneficial because it broke the pattern of estrangement. Nonetheless, in 
the long run this strategy was problematic. In the realm of geopolitics, a relationship 
based on the common resentment of an adversary is very weak. In his doctoral 
dissertation, Kissinger emphasizes this notion: “For opposition can create a wide 
consensus, perhaps even the widest attainable one, but its components, united by what 
they do not like, may be greatly at odds about what should replace it.”26 The demise of 
the Soviet Union, significantly strained this fragile relationship, and will be discussed in 
Chapter four.  
However, given the magnitude of the divide in ideological values, the strategic 
threat of the Soviet Union was the only thing strong enough to initially bridge the gap 
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between China and the U.S. Since this first common interest only provided the possibility 
for a fleeting alliance, Nixon and Kissinger solidified the foundations of the relationship 
by simultaneously advancing the second common interest. The exchange of cultures and 
markets during the process rapprochement legitimized the incentives for engaging. Even 
though this second common interest was less prominent than the first, it provided a 
framework for the future normalization of US/Chinese relations. The cultural and 
economic relationship that developed following these initial effort, helped ease the strain 
put on the relationship when the external threat of the Soviet Union evaporated. More 
importantly, it was Nixon’s pursuit of this second interest during rapprochement that 
facilitated China’s integration into the community of nations. Furthermore, the process of 
opening China set the tone for the development of future relations: a policy of 
engagement based on the interplay of collaboration and competition.  
SEC. 1: A HISTORY OF HOSTILITIES  
 Nixon and Kissinger’s efforts to open China were plagued by twenty years of 
estrangement, motivated by hostilities originating in the early phases of the Cold War. In 
1949, when the Sino-American conflict began, much of the world was divided into two 
ideological camps: communists and capitalists.Thus, when the Communist revolution 
descended upon Beijing, establishing the People’s Republic of China, Washington’s 
deepest fear was realized: the creation of a monolithic communist bloc whose sphere of 
influence would now extend throughout Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia. In many 
prominent circles within the United States, it was seen as nothing less than a Communist 
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conspiracy for world domination.27 This idea was further ingrained in the minds of 
American policy makers with the onset of the Korean War in 1950. In a letter to the 
British foreign minister, Secretary of State Dean Acheson wrote, “there can be little 
doubt but that Communism, with China as one spear-head, has now embarked upon an 
assault against Asia with immediate objectives in Korea, Indo-China, Burma…”.28 It was 
the official perception in the U.S. that the “Red Tide” was moving to engulf all of Asia. 
As a result, Washington adjusted its policies accordingly with respect to Beijing.  
 Containment and isolation were the tenant features of U.S. China policy for the 
next twenty years. Washington implemented a series of abrasive military and diplomatic 
tactics, or the purposes of advancing this strategy. These actions, in turn, elicited a 
reciprocal hostile response in Beijing. Beginning with the Truman Administration and 
ending with Nixon’s, direct American diplomatic relations were severed with Beijing. 
Furthermore, a pervasive U.S. effort to block China’s admission to the United Nations 
emerged, as well as a strict ban on trade with the mainland. China responded to these 
moves by sending economic and military aid to anti-Western and left-wing movements 
throughout Asia, where Vietnam was only one of many recipients. 
The most critical manifestation of Washington’s new position concerning China 
was its shift in policy towards Taiwan, which became the central issue dividing the 
nations. In June 1950, President Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet to protect Taiwan, 
thereby reaffirming America’s commitment to the security of the island. This action was 
followed by the resumption of military assistance to Taipei and a subsequent mutual 
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defense treaty with the Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-Shek.29 Moreover, the 
United States supported the position that the legal status of Taiwan was undecided, but it 
would no longer be recognized as a part of the mainland. Essentially, this had the effect 
of supporting Chiang Kai-Shek’s position, which claimed that the ROC was the sole 
legitimate ruler of China. Undoubtedly, this implied that the Communist government in 
Beijing was illegitimate and should therefore the PRC should not be recognized as a 
major world power. The PRC vehemently refuted this policy, citing that Taiwan was 
indeed a part of the mainland. In addition, Mao’s government claimed the mutual defense 
treaty, as well as the U.S. military mission on the island were a violation of China’s 
national sovereignty, and as a result should be readily dealt with through force. The 
“Taiwan Issue” became the biggest obstacle for Nixon and Kissinger in their pursuit of 
rapprochement. It was the hostilities surrounding Taiwan that almost brought China and 
United States to military confrontation during Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958. In the current 
state of affairs, although the dimensions behind the disagreement have changed to some 
extent, the Taiwan issue remains a substantive problem in U.S.-China relations. The 
nature of it will be further examined both chapter three and four. 
At the height of the Cold War, investment, cultural relations, and intellectual 
exchanges were entirely absent. The true character of estrangement is best illustrated in 
the following description: 
There were no formal diplomatic ties, no trade, no legal travel back and forth, 
and virtually no mutual contact between ordinary citizens of the two 
countries…Probably never in the modern period have two major societies been 
so isolated from each other for so long in peacetime…China and the United 
States confronted each other, at a distance, as implacable adversaries.30
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With the absence of even limited cultural, diplomatic, and economic exchanges, the U.S. 
and China had no insight into each other’s political climate. Consequently, a tendency to 
exaggerate Chinese capabilities and miscalculate their objectives became standard 
practice in Washington. When events in the international system began to favor the 
prospect of reconciliation, above all else, it was a misinformed perception of China that 
prevented the possibility of rapprochement in earlier Administrations. 
During the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, futile attempts were made to 
reach out to Beijing. These minimal conciliatory gestures, however, were ill received by 
the Chinese. At the time, the PRC was invigorated with zealous fervor emanating from 
the Cultural Revolution.31 The destructive effects of the program were not yet apparent. 
Mao believed any concessions made to the U.S. would be interpreted as a sign of 
weakness and serve to undermine his absolute authority. In 1968, motivated by the 
revolutionary tide, China suspended bilateral ambassadorial contacts in Warsaw, which 
remained the sole official diplomatic contacts between the two nations.32 The war in 
Vietnam heightened feelings of animosity on the part of the U.S. towards the Chinese, 
who were financing the North Vietnamese war effort.  
 In the years that followed, a huge information gap was developed. As a result of 
being isolated from one another, an environment developed to foster fears and anxieties 
in both countries. A lack of communication combined with these sentiments gave way to 
false preconceptions of each other’s objectives. This led to the creation and 
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implementation of faulty policy. It was portrayed as a petulant adversary, whose values 
were incompatible with those of liberal democracy, and therefore not worthy of 
negotiations until Beijing modified its behavior. Although, American opinion concerning 
China was divided, it was this one which reflected the majority consensus and strongly 
supported by a powerful China Lobby.  
SEC. 2: RAPPROCHEMENT WITH CHINA 
When Nixon took office, certain events came to his assistance, that brightened the 
possibility of a reconciliation between China and the U.S. Beginning in 1956, with 
Khrushchev’s revelations of Stalin’s brutalities, an ideological rift ensued between the 
two communists giants.33 However, it was not until the Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia in 1968, followed by Brezhnev’s statement citing Moscow’s indefinite 
right to intervene in the domestic affairs of any communist country, that China began to 
alter its perception of the USSR from ally to adversary.34 The fear Soviet expansionism 
in Asia was exacerbated in the minds Mao and Zhou during a Sino-Soviet border clash in 
1969. Chinese anxieties continued to mount in the face of the Soviet’s deployment of a 
large number of troops along the Ussuri River. Nevertheless, while circumstances may 
have helped, it is doubtful “whether rapprochement could have occurred with the same 
decisiveness in any other Presidency”.35 More precisely, it was Nixon’s tremendous 
foresight and intuition setting the policy direction coupled with Kissinger’s shrewd 
diplomatic skill in its implementation that gave life to the policy of rapprochement. China 
had figured extensively into Nixon’s early political career. It was his vision that dictated 
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the nature of the policy and guaranteed it would be carried out. A closer analysis 
regarding some of his statements concerning U.S. China policy will better illustrate this 
point and provide a foundation for understanding “engagement” policy that was pursued. 
In 1954, in a NSC meeting leading up to the Geneva Conference, Nixon privately argued 
it would best serve national interests of the United States to consider the possibility of 
trading with Communist China.36 He cited that trade could be used as a bargaining chip 
in negotiations to pursue more direct contact with the PRC without having to recognize 
the government. What is important to highlight in this early policy recommendation, is 
the larger strategic backdrop against upon which Nixon rested his argument. The trade 
proposal reflected Nixon’s deeper conviction that “China was too important” to the 
United States to be ignored or isolated. It was the key to Asia…and Washington simply 
had to engage with the issue of China in its Asian strategy.”37
 An article Nixon wrote for Foreign Affairs in 1967, entitled “Asia After 
Vietnam”, is often cited in the relevant literature as the clearest articulation of Nixon’s 
later China strategy. In his memoirs, Nixon himself wrote that the arguments presented 
were the most public revelation of his strong belief in the importance of establishing 
relations between the United States and China. Nixon wrote: 
Taking the long view, we simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside 
the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten 
its neighbors. There is no place on this small planet for a billion of its potentially 
most able people to live in angry isolation…For the short run, then, this means a 
policy of firm restrain, of no reward, of a creative counter pressure designed to 
persuade Peking that its interests can be served only by accepting the basic rules 
of international civility. For the long run, it means pulling China back in the 
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world community—but as a great and progressing nation, not as the epicenter of 
world revolution.38
 
Nixon, again, addressed these points in his inaugural address. His argument carried 
tremendous foresight into the events of international relations. He understood that the 
realities of the international structure would eventually force the U.S. to engage with 
China. He concluded it was better to pacify the existing hostilities while China was in a 
weaker position.  
Once in office however, above all else, Nixon’s China policy was primarily 
motivated by his desire to ease growing tensions with the Soviet Union. Nixon believed 
he could accomplish this by pursuing a relationship with China and adding a triangular 
dynamic to the bi-polar conflict. The leverage gained by playing the “China Card” would 
in his mind accelerate the pace of strategic arms negotiations between the two 
superpowers. Kissinger was intrigued by Nixon’s early ideas on China, but not entirely 
convinced. He believed the prospect for rapprochement would only be possible in the 
face of a real and present danger to China on the part of the Soviet Union. With the 
growing military tensions at the Soviet-Chinese boarder, Kissinger got the assurance he 
needed. 
Nixon and Kissinger postulated that China’s mounting security concerns resulting 
from the growing external military threats presented by the Soviet Union would be 
motivated to improve relations with the United States. Consequently, it was this variable 
that would determine the success of Nixon and Kissinger’s strategy. Guided by the 
theoretical stipulations of structural realism, Nixon and Kissinger wagered that Mao and 
Zhou’s concerns to ensure the security of China would “override their disdain for 
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capitalism, unity with Hanoi, and even their desire for the unification of Taiwan to the 
mainland, issues that had isolated the nations from each other for almost twenty years”.39 
To advance their strategy, Nixon and Kissinger would have to open the lines of 
communication so as to inform the Chinese of their intentions.  
In the fall of 1969, Nixon and Kissinger began taking steps that would allow them 
to communicate more directly with the Chinese. After Nixon had set the policy direction, 
Kissinger took the appropriate measures to advance it. He instructed Walter Stoessel, the 
American ambassador in Warsaw, to contact the Chinese ambassador, Lei Yang. Stoessel 
was told to request the resumption of ambassadorial talks for the purpose of discussing 
prospects for future high-level negotiations. Beijing was readily informed of this 
invitation and shortly thereafter instructed Yang to set up a meeting. On January 20, 
1970, Stoessel and Yang met and marked “a new beginning” in U.S.-China relations.40 In 
this first informal gathering, Stoessel made it clear to Yang that Nixon was prepared to 
send a high-ranking official from his administration or receive one from China to discuss 
issues of national interest to both nations. On February 20th, speaking on the behalf of 
Mao, Yang told Stoessel “the Chinese would be pleased to receive a high-level envoy to 
explore further solutions to the fundamental questions of Sino-American relations.”41
 This meeting, which seems insignificant when set against the magnitude of the 
endeavor it sought to accomplish, was a major benchmark in the rapprochement process. 
For the first time, Beijing was made acutely aware of the seriousness behind the Nixon 
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Administration’s intentions of opening a political dialogue between the two countries. 
From this point forward, both sides understood there was a common desire for improving 
relations. The Warsaw contact clarified any mixed signals Beijing was receiving from 
Washington. It was the first in a series of moves to correct the misperceptions that 
prolonged the estrangement.  Moreover, the Stoessel/Yang encounter was the departure 
point for subsequent high-level diplomatic negotiations. As a result, Nixon and Kissinger 
began to prepare for such a summit. However, their efforts were hindered by what 
Kissinger called “bureaucratic foot dragging” of the worse kind.42
 The State Department remained distrustful of Beijing’s intentions. Representative 
of the bureaucracy’s cautionary nature, it took the position that such an exchange 
necessitated a clear change in China’s confrontational policies with the U.S. In addition, 
State worried that a meeting of this caliber would compromise America’s alliance with 
Japan and Taiwan. These objections from the State Department coupled with the 
American invasion of Cambodia in 1970, which China vociferously condemned, had the 
affect of prolonging any diplomatic encounter between American and Chinese officials. 
Nevertheless, this temporary strain in U.S.-China relations, which had delayed the 
possibility of a meeting, was eased in a matter of months.  It was due, in part, to the 
withdrawal of American troops from Cambodia in July, which was further supplemented 
by conciliatory concessions on the part of the U.S. allowing for the exchange of material 
goods between some of America’s European Allies and the Chinese.43
The protests stemming from the State Department did not prove to be as palatable, 
as those of the Chinese. The bureaucratic constraints, which continued delaying any 
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further actions to implement their strategy, greatly exacerbated Nixon and Kissinger’s 
disdain and mistrust of bureaucracy. Their solution to the problem at hand was simple: 
the exclusion of the State Department from any knowledge or decision-making 
concerning the China initiative. In 1970, two secret channels, were established with the 
Chinesein which the White House would directly manage the contacts. The second of 
these channels, which went through Pakistan, yielded the greatest success and ultimately 
gave way to Kissinger’s secret trip. 44
On December 8, 1970, Kissinger received a message from the Chinese via the 
Pakistani channel. It was a message written by Zhou under Mao’s instructions to Nixon, 
inviting a representative of the president to come to China. It outlined that the primary 
purpose for the meeting was to discuss the American presence in Taiwan. Zhou conveyed 
the tremendous significance of this message by highlighting how it was the first time in 
their numerous contacts that a proposal for such an exchange was issued from one head 
of state to another.45 Thrilled at the prospect of finally meeting the Chinese, Nixon and 
Kissinger, understood that limiting the agenda to Taiwan would undermine their strategic 
objectives. Solely discussing Taiwan may have led to a stalemate early on in the process 
of rapprochement. It was believed that this scenario could be avoided by exaggerating the 
threat of Soviet expansionism, which they believed was Beijing’s overarching national 
interest. In Kissinger’s response he emphasized this point, citing that the meeting “would 
not only be limited to Taiwan but would encompass other steps designed to improve 
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relations and reduce tensions”.46 With the exception of minor exchanges, this 
correspondence was followed by months of silence.  
During the ensuing interim period, Kissinger took various measures to educate 
himself on China.47 His task was to find a means of improving relations without 
compromising the U.S. commitment to Taiwan. At this point it was clear that Taiwan 
would be a perpetual irritant in their course of their negotiations and would continue to 
block gradual improvement in U.S.-China relations. Therefore, in devising the American 
approach, Kissinger understood it was necessary to reduce the centrality of Taiwan. 
Studying an array of issues confronting Chinese policymakers allowed Kissinger to gain 
a better understanding of Beijing’s national priorities, and where Taiwan realistically fell 
on this spectrum. Diplomatic success is entirely dependent on the negotiators ability to 
precisely calculate the other side’s objectives. As a dedicated student of diplomacy, 
Kissinger understood this better than anyone.  He concluded that above all else, China 
sought a relationship with the U.S. to counterweight the threat of Soviet expansionism.48 
The issue of Taiwan could be marginalized if the Soviet threat appeared eminent. 
Nevertheless, Nixon and Kissinger realized that a “gift” was necessary to appease the 
Chinese grievances over the issue. This would take the form of the PRC’s acceptance into 
the U.N. and the removal of Taiwan, an event that will be discussed in a later section.  
On April 6, 1971 the months of silence were broken when the Chinese 
spontaneously invited an American table tennis team to visit China after its participation 
in the World Table Tennis Championship in Japan. Mao, himself, extended the invitation. 
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The whole visit was designed to inform the White House that Beijing had noticed its 
initiatives and eager to proceed.49 This exchange helped in some part to ease existing 
tensions. It was a public message to the world that the relationship between China and the 
U.S. was changing. It marked yet another breakthrough in relations. On April 27, 
Kissinger received another message inviting him to Beijing, but this time Zhou had 
dropped the demand for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Taiwan as a precondition and 
agreed to the stipulations that Taiwan would be among one of many issues discussed.50
Shortly thereafter, Nixon agreed to send Kissinger as his emissary in the first set 
of negotiations to outline an agenda for his summit with Mao. The details of Kissinger’s 
visit were meticulously planned to preserve the secrecy of the endeavor. During his 
scheduled tour of Asia, while visiting Pakistan, Kissinger boarded a commercial 
Pakistani airliner in disguise and secretly slipped away to Beijing. The Administration’s 
public alibi was that Kissinger had fallen ill with a severe stomach virus and had to 
withdraw to the seclusion of a private facility for proper medical treatment.  
 Once in Beijing, Kissinger met with Zhou over a three-day period. The purpose 
of the exchange was meant to outline the foreign policy objectives of both nations, while 
drawing particular emphasis to areas of cooperation that could serve as the basis for 
improving ties, in preparation for Nixon’s visit.51 Through this experience, Kissinger was 
able to gain an understanding of the issues motivating Chinese behavior and prepare the 
                                                 
49 Macmillan, Margaret. Nixon and Mao: The Week that Changed the World. New York: 
Random House, 2007. P.180 
50 Schaller, Michael. “Détente and the Strategic Triangle, or ‘Drinking Your Mao Tai and 
Having your Vodka too’.” In Re-examining the Cold War: U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1954-
1973.  Edited by Roberts S. Ross and Jiang Changbin. Cambridge, Mass., 2001. P.373 
51 Schulzinger, Robert D. Henry Kissinger: Dr. of Diplomacy. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1989. P.  91 
 34
Administration’s diplomatic agenda accordingly. In the negotiations that followed, it was 
clear that each side had an issue of primary importance. For China, it was Taiwan, and 
for the United States it was extrication from Vietnam.52
Zhou reiterated the longstanding Chinese position on Taiwan. Although they 
would not use force to integrate the island into the mainland, the PRC opposed special 
status for Taiwan and demanded to replace it in the U.N. in order to recognize the 
communist government as the legitimate authority of China.53 Furthermore he insisted 
upon the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the island. On the issue of Vietnam, Zhou 
articulated the traditional revolutionary standpoint, denouncing the conflict as an 
illegitimate and imperialistic endeavor. The American war effort was a violated the 
national sovereignty of the North Vietnamese and went against the principles of the 
Revolution. 
On the issue of Taiwan Kissinger made several concessions. First, he cited the 
reduction of American troops would be linked to the improvement of relations with the 
PRC and the termination of the Vietnam conflict. Second, he assured Zhou that 
Washington would object to any attack by Taiwan against China. Thirdly, he informed 
Zhou that in his second term, Nixon would formally recognize the PRC. Lastly, Kissinger 
told Zhou that Washington was prepared to support the reinstatement of China to the 
United Nations, so long as it did not replace Taiwan.54 Although Zhou, and above all 
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Mao, was not completely satisfied with these concessions, they were sufficient enough to 
allow for further improvement in relations.  
The most significant issue raised in this first encounter, however, was China’s 
concern of Soviet expansionism in and Asia. Zhou expressed his desire that the United 
States would be willing to cooperate with China in order to maintain the balance of 
power in the region.55 All this, confirmed Kissinger’s suspicions. He quickly moved to 
implement his strategy. Kissinger informed Zhou, that for the reasons he raised, it was 
vital to maintain an American military presence in the region. In order to convince Zhou 
of the rationality behind this logic, Kissinger proceeded to provide him with American 
intelligence data regarding the Soviet military deployment along the Chinese border.56 
The purpose of this gesture was two fold. First, it served to exaggerate and confirm 
China’s greatest security threat. Secondly, it was meant to reassure Zhou and Mao of the 
U.S. commitment to collaborate on the issue by sharing classified information. Kissinger 
eased any further anxieties but assuring Zhou that the U.S. would not collaborate with 
Moscow in any endeavors that were aimed against the Chinese. Zhou and Kissinger 
would meet again in October to outline the terms of the joint communiqué. 
In hindsight, it is impossible to ignore the magnitude of the challenge laying 
before these men in this first exchange. Kissinger and Zhou represented societies that on 
the surface appeared ideologically and culturally incompatible. In addition, the issue of 
Taiwan, with no immediate resolution in sight, seemed to reduce the importance of any 
other potential areas of collaboration. Nevertheless, Kissinger and Zhou were able to 
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overcome these impediments by engaging in a constructive dialogue based on 
exchanging their perceptions of global and Asian affairs.57 It provided a clear 
understanding of each other’s purpose and worldview. Furthermore, it established a level 
of confidence between the two men that is necessary for the success of any diplomatic 
negotiations. By exchanging their ideas, Kissinger and Zhou realized that pragmatic 
security concerns overrode ideology on both sides. Zhou explained to Kissinger that a 
tradition of common interests existed between their two societies. However, much as 
Kissinger predicted, the one that was strong enough to override existing tensions was 
their mutual resentment and fear of the Soviet Union.  A common security threat had the 
effect allowing for a breakthrough in relations without the immediate resolutions to issues 
such as Taiwan.  
Mao was pleased with the outcome of the meeting. He approved the language of a 
decree, drafted by Zhou and Kissinger, inviting Nixon to visit China. The announcement 
was carefully prepared so to present the visit as the product of equal efforts on the parts 
of both nations. This way Nixon would not be seen as paying tribute to the Chinese, and 
Mao’s invitation would not be interpreted as a sign of weakness. It established an image 
of equality and mutual respect.  
Back in the United States, Nixon was attempting to secure domestic support for 
his policy initiative. He conferred with high level Republican Senators and convinced 
them of the importance surrounding the initiative. His efforts were successful. Once 
Kissinger returned with a positive report, they began to draft what would become the 
Shanghai Communiqué, issued at the end of Nixon’s trip. After the completion of this 
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first draft, Nixon ordered Kissinger to return to China in October in order to prepare the 
agenda for his visit and draft the language of the communiqué with Zhou.58
The first draft Kissinger presented to Zhou followed what Nixon described as 
“standard diplomatic formula using vague and conciliatory language to patch over the 
most heated and insoluble problems”.59 Here, Nixon is primarily referring to the issue of 
Taiwan. Zhou rejected the draft at once on the grounds of its superficiality. True 
progress, he cited, would only come from a realistic assessment of the “fundamental 
differences” between the two nations.60 However, the version Zhou proposed contained 
such radical and inflammatory language that an agreement on Nixon’s part would 
compromise core American values.  
In order to reach a compromise, Kissinger agreed that the communiqué follow the 
format suggested by Zhou: an outline of the differences between China and the U.S on 
various geopolitical issues. To improve the prospect of normalizing relations in the future 
however, Kissinger successfully argued that the document should include areas of 
agreement as well.61 His insistence on this point fit into the larger strategy for pursuing 
the opening. While differences existed, it was important to highlight any the areas of 
cooperation for the development of further positive relations. It provided a counterweight 
to the differences that threatened this possibility. Furthermore, highlighting areas of 
cooperation in this official document sent a message to the world that Nixon’s trip had 
succeeded in advancing the position of Sino-American relations. The areas of agreement 
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were i) the opposition of Soviet expansionism in Asia, and ii) expanding the Sino-
American cultural and economic relationship.62 The document stated on both parts the 
hope for securing the normalization of relations and establishing formal and lasting 
diplomatic ties. 
The question of Taiwan, however, was more difficult to resolve and further 
delayed Nixon’s trip. Significant concessions were necessary for any progress to take 
place. On the part of the United States, it abandoned its former position opposing the 
Chinese one stating that there was only one China and Taiwan was part of China. 
Nevertheless, while the U.S. would not challenge this did not mean that is would 
necessarily accept it. Furthermore, the U.S. pledged to ultimately withdraw all American 
troops from the island, but would do so only in the wake of a peaceful settlement over the 
issue.63 During his visit to China, Nixon was able to secure support for the document and 
the future of relations by privately promising to accept any peaceful solution to the 
Taiwan issue, refusing to support independence movements on the island, and advancing 
the normalization of relations. China’s admission to the U.N. in October of 1970 and the 
removal of Taiwan, which Nixon carefully ensured would not be blocked by the 
American delegation, helped to accelerate the pace of his visit.64 While these concessions 
allowed for the possibility of Nixon’s visit, they were not bold enough to substantially 
alter the differences divided the two nations over the issue of Taiwan. For this reason, the 
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normalization of relations would be delayed another six years. Essentially the Shanghai 
Communiqué was designed to ensure and uphold the image of progress in Sino-American 
relations, while not compromising either side’s position on the problem of Taiwan.65 
Thus, because of the centrality of the stated common interests to the to each nation’s 
national interests collaboration was possible in spite of an immediate resolution to 
Taiwan. 
After months of planning, Nixon arrived in China on February 21, 1972. He 
sufficiently educated himself on Mao and China, so that he might bond with the dictator 
and eliminate the possibility of offending him out of ignorance. Throughout the entire 
visit, Nixon exaggerated the threat of Soviet expansionism, embellishing the facts when 
necessary. In on of his first meetings with Mao he asked him, “why did the Soviets have 
more forces on the border facing you than facing Western Europe?”66 For the Chinese, 
this had the effect of reducing the outstanding issues of Taiwan and Indochina. In his 
meetings with Zhou, Nixon continued to stress the importance of balancing the Soviet 
threat in Asia. He reiterated Kissinger’ promises of not making any agreements with the 
Soviets aimed against China. Secretly, he pledged to pursue the normalization of relations 
and hoped he could achieve this in his second term.  
Nixon’s trip and the Shanghai Communiqué allowed China and the U.S. to 
expand their diplomatic contacts, establishing normal diplomatic exchanges Paris and the 
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United Nations. This provided both countries with greater information and knowledge of 
one another of which was used to accurately guide the formation of their policies. Set 
against the enormity of the endeavor they set out to accomplish, the shortcomings of 
Nixon and Kissinger’s opening of China are outweighed by its successes.  It bridged the 
gap left by twenty years of estrangement and gave way to what is perhaps the most 
important relationship defining the structure of the international political and economic 
system. In his last night in China, while giving a toast at the final banquet, Nixon 
downplayed the shortcomings of the rapprochement, and highlighted its successes. He 
said that the language of the communiqué was not nearly as significant as the future 
developments that were yet to come in the opening of this relationship. The single most 
important consideration at that point was “what we will do in the years ahead to build a 
bridge across the 16,000 miles and twenty-two years of hostility which have divided us in 
the past.”67 The summit provided the framework for achieving these ends and altering the 
structure of the global system to provide greater stability. For this reason, “it was the 
week that changed the world.”68
Sec. 3: Overview of Normalization and Implications for the Future 
“[On recognizing China] But if you recognize anyone it does not mean you like them…” 
 
Sir Winston Churchill 
In November of 1973, Kissinger informed the Chinese that the Nixon 
Administration was “determined to do much more and to complete the process of 
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normalization we started two years ago as rapidly as possible”69 during its second term. 
Nixon, however, was never able to deliver this promise during his remaining tenure as 
President. Ultimately, there were a number of factors obstructing Nixon’s ability to fully 
execute his vision. Outstanding questions surrounding the status of Taiwan continued to 
hinder the possibility of a breakthrough in negotiations.The greatest factors obstructing 
Nixon and Kissinger’s ability to deliver these results were, however, domestic. In the 
wake of America’s extrication from Vietnam, Nixon was falling under increasing 
scrutiny from the Congressional investigation for his role in the Watergate Scandal.Thus, 
“by 1973, according to Kissinger, Watergate was distracting Nixon and seriously 
harming the ability of the United States to conduct foreign relations”.70 The revelations 
of the numerous abuses of power that constituted the Watergate Scandal and Nixon’s 
resignation, left Congress and the American public disillusioned and bewildered. The 
consequence was a tremendous decline in respect for the office of the presidency and the 
legitimacy of its authority. These realities of the domestic climate and his close ties to 
Watergate as Nixon’s Vice President, robbed Gerald Ford of any political capital that 
might have allowed him to finalize the process of normalization with China during his 
presidency. The process was dragged out for five long years until 1979.  
China was also experiencing a similar crisis of authority. As Mao lay dying, there 
was no clear successor that would assume the leadership of the Communist Party and 
somewhat of a power struggle ensued. Kissinger tireless efforts were further hampered 
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when his confidant Zhou passed away. In the absence of Zhou’s pragmatism, a senile 
Mao was unwilling to relinquish the ideological base of his convictions, namely on the 
position of Taiwan, to allow for a breakthrough in relations. Although Taiwan continued 
to present itself as an irritant to the progression of U.S.-China relations during the Ford 
Administration, the domestic tied in both countries played a greater role in delaying the 
process. Once new leaders were instated in both nations the process was able to move 
forward. 
Normalization: Striking a “Compromise” on Taiwan 
In 1978 Deng Xiaoping secured his power hold in China. He was pragmatic in his 
deliberations and as a result seized the opportunity for a breakthrough with the United 
States at this time. He appealed to the Carter Administration to take a more proactive 
attitude on the issue of Taiwan so as to accelerate the pace of negotiations. Consequently, 
the central focus of these exchangesbecame U.S.’s relationship with Taiwan after 
diplomatic relations resumed.  
 The Chinese position on this issue can be delineated into three points, and are 
largely reminiscent of the earlier concerns presented during the course of Kissinger and 
Zhou’s negotiations: 
(i) Taiwan is Chinese territory. Therefore, the U.S. military presence 
on the island constitutes as a violation of China’s sovereignty 
because it is regarded as interference in the country’s internal 
affairs.  
(ii) In order for normalizations to proceed, the U.S. must cease 
diplomatic contact with Taipei, withdraw its armed forces for the 
island, and abolish the Mutual Defense Treaty. But it can continue 
to have unofficial contacts with Taiwan. 
(iii) Discontinue selling weapons to Taiwan71 
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Under President Carter, the U.S. rejected this third demand, and maintained that it would 
continue providing weapons to Taiwan. Additionally, the American delegation demanded 
a minimum of one year’s notice to the government of Taiwan before it would forge its 
security obligations set forth by the terms of the Mutual Defense Treaty.On this issue, 
both sides made concessions. The U.S. agreed to terminate the Mutual Defense treaty and 
China granted it a year to do it. Ultimately, however, a full agreement was never reached.  
The outstanding issue, that remains a source of diplomatic tensions in the present 
day, was the question of U.S.  arms sells to Taiwan. China continues to object to these 
transfers of weapons. Although the United States “conceded” that it would forge its 
official diplomatic ties and recognition of the Island, it continues to maintain unofficial 
relations set forth by the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. This includes “commercial, 
cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States…and Taiwan”.72 
Nevertheless, as discussed below, the language concerning the U.S.’s commitment to 
Taiwan’s defense carries an official tone, despite this appearance of comprise on the issue 
of the Mutual Defense Treaty.  
At the time, Deng objected to these unbalanced concessions but maintained that it 
should not block the process from continuing. His solution was that both sides would 
state their own positions on the matter and agree to resolve this matter at a later date. The 
Chinese maintained that the “One China” position and that unification was an internal 
matter and does not render international interference. Deng and subsequent Chinese 
leaders added, however, that China would seek a peaceful course for reunification. U.S. 
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policy is vague and ambiguous in regards to the future political status of Taiwan. It has 
sought to maintain a neutral position by making a commitment to advance peaceful 
resolution to the issue. Under this general claim, the U.S. has pursued a policy of “dual 
assurance and dual restraint” since 1979 that encourages China to pursue unification 
through peaceful means and discourages Taiwan from pushing for statehood. Yet, section 
three of the Taiwan Relations Act obliges the U.S. defend the security of the island 
should China seek reunification by coercive measures. This includes preemptive 
measures of continual arms sales in order to enhance the sufficient self-defense 
capabilities of Taiwan.73 Such explicit defense and security transactions and 
commitments are usually only between states that share official diplomatic contacts. 
Deng’s desire to proceed with his domestic and economic performs motivated him to 
allow for a breakthrough despite his objections to what he perceived to be elusive and 
duplicitous maneuvers on the part of the U.S. Once both sides agreed to disagree on this 
matter, China and the United States published the Joint communiqué on the 
Establishment of Diplomatic Relation between the United States and the People’s 
Republic of Chinaon December 15, 1978. It was the formal declaration that the United 
States and China had decided to recognize each other and as of January 1, 1979 would 
establish official diplomatic contacts. 
Deng’s pragmatism was a necessary component to the success of normalization, 
but above all else, his greatest skill was patience. Deng understood that in order for China 
to one day fulfill its destiny and become a “great power” it would have to bide its time 
and make concessions along the way. In his diplomatic negotiations with the United 
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States, he played off American impulsivity and necessity for instantaneous results. Deng 
made compromises and concessions that forfeited many of China’s ideological 
convictions when he proceeded with negotiations despite an agreement over Taiwan. 
Deng granted his American counterparts this short-term victory. But China’s recent 
economic success and its rise a geopolitical force seem to signal that there was a greater 
purpose in mind. One of the tenet features of Deng’s vision for China was the country 
should “disguise its ambitions and hide its claws,” allowing it to accumulate its power 
without interruptions of threats of containment.74 As a result, China consented to the 
imbalanced terms of U.S. engagement in order to secure access to its markets. 
Normalization gave way to the political and economic exchanges as well as the transfer 
of ideas, namely technological expertise, that were crucial to China’s development. Deng 
predicted it was the only way China would become strong enough to correct this 
distortion of power and reverse the perceived century long humiliation it suffered at the 
hands of Western Powers.   
Presently, China’s recent economic success is allowing it to demand for more 
equal terms in its bilateral relations with the U.S and exercise greater resistance to any 
terms that may comprise its own interests. In many ways this complicates the pattern of 
engagement set forth by Nixon and Kissinger hinging on the assumption that China is a 
weaker power and its interests can be shaped accordingly. The chapters ahead explore the 
origins of this new assertiveness in China’s international behavior and how it is 
manifesting itself in the present state of U.S.-China relations. 
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CHAPTER 3:  
China’s Rise and the Challenges it 
presents to U.S.-China Relations 
 
Now China is very weak. She will grown strong, rich, and independent only after many years; but the 
important thing is that we must learn to remember these things…We shall emerge in the world as a 
nation with an advanced culture…And one with power.75
 
Mao Zedong 1949  
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The essential precondition for China’s integration into the global community was 
the normalization of diplomatic relations with the United States in 1979. By opening the 
country to foreign investments and new trade opportunities, this newly established 
relationship accelerated the pace of China’s transformation into a competitive and 
market-based capitalist economy. Arguably, the exposure to and participation in the 
international market system, a process that was largely facilitated by the U.S., is the force 
responsible for China’s emergence as a major geopolitical power. In recent years, 
however, the process of engagement and integration unleashed during the 1972 
rapprochement and the process of normalization is producing adverse effects for the U.S. 
The original intention was to bridge the political and cultural gap between China and the 
U.S by shaping China’s interest in ways compatible with those of the U.S. However, 
China’s ability to retain the authoritarian character of its government while implementing 
a rigorous program of economic liberalizations challenges the effectiveness of this model. 
Now because of its economic power, China can exercise greater resistance in meeting 
demands that run contrary to national interests. China’s rise has therefore brought into 
shaper focus the divergent opinions it holds with U.S. over an array of political and 
security matters that have existed since 1979, while also adding new strains in the 
bilateral economic dialogue. This chapter illustrates how these developments contribute 
to growing tensions in the United State’s political relationship with China.  
For the most part, the perceived competition is largely limited to the areas of: (i) 
finance; (ii) demand for finite natural resources; (iii) security matters; and (iv) concern 
over China's growing economic power due to continuing large trade surpluses that have 
provided China with reserves equivalent to $1.5 trillion. These reserves continue to rise 
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on upward growth path. Yet, the symbolic implications of this early competition have 
many fearing a return to the power politics of the Cold War. Prestige and influence 
ranked among the most important of national interests in this power dynamic. As China 
continues to emerge as a dominant economic force on the global stage, its newfound 
power is steadily translating into diplomatic leverage that penetrates far beyond its own 
boarders. China now has “soft power” in regions, such as Latin America, the Middle 
East, and the Asia-Pacific, that have been considered to fall under America’s sphere of 
influence. For realists within the U.S., who adhere to the Nixon/Kissinger model of 
realpolitik, it appears the U.S. is locked into what seems to be "the power struggle of the 
twenty first century" with China.76 From this standpoint, China is seen as a formidable 
rival or a potential “peer competitor.”  Consequently, this group believes that preemptive 
unilateral measures should be taken to protect U.S. interests, namely its power, by 
containing China's growing influence. Throughout the twentieth century this was the 
predominant pattern in U.S. foreign policy whenever this country’s regional power 
monopoly was threatened. They maintain that this practice will give way to a U.S. 
Chinese strategic and security rivalry. This chapter provides an overview of the issues 
and disputes contributing to this image of China as a rival, which, in turn, has 
compromised the clarity and consistency of U.S. China policy. 
China’s economic power is visibly altering the distribution of power in its 
relationship with United States, when for at least the last seventy or eighty years the U.S. 
has maintained a sizeable advantage over China.  This, accordingly, has a direct effect on 
the state of their political affairs because of Beijing’s newfound assertiveness in its 
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foreign policy. Thus, the chapter also demonstrates how this new development, resulting 
from its economic success, is complicating the traditional tactics of U.S. engagement 
when faced with new political and security challenges presented by a more powerful 
China. The competition that is unfolding between the two states is mitigating each one’s 
approach to sensitive diplomatic issues. These issues include, but are not limited to: i) 
human rights and civil liberties; ii) how best to approach the problem of nuclear 
proliferation in Iran; iii) military or other or non-intervention in the internal affairs of 
sovereign states, such as Iraq, Iran, Sudan and now Kosovo; and iv) the future political 
status of Taiwan.77 The most delicate and potentially explosive of these is the issue of 
Taiwan. As of the present day, it is the single security matter that holds a realistic 
potential for engaging the two countries in a direct military conflict. China and the U.S., 
however, have been able to avoid positioning each other as potential security threats over 
this issue since 1979.78 This change in attitude derives from a combination of things. 
Taiwan has been transformed into a pressing matter of national security for many leading 
parts of the U.S. government, particularly the Pentagon, because of a belief that China 
will become a future adversary. China’s growing economic and military power, coupled 
with the potentiality for ongoing strategic competition with the U.S. over finite energy 
resources contribute to this perception. 
Despite such pressing issues, presently U.S. policy towards Beijing is ambivalent 
at best. This uncertainty results primarily from the fact that China’s future course is 
shrouded by ambiguity. While the country continues to grow at an astounding rate, it is 
                                                 
77 This Chapter, however, will limit itself to analyzing the dispute of military intervention 
in the case of Sudan 
78 Kynge, James. China Shakes the World: A Titan’s Rise and Troubled Future—and the 
Challenge for America. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2006. P. 234 
 50
plagued by pervasive social ailments that greatly inhibit its power. The previous chapters 
maintained the position that the ultimate goal of the U.S.  engagement policy, and the 
primary motive for integrating China into the world system, is to help shape its interest in 
ways conducive to those of the U.S. Furthermore, in the past, engagement largely was 
based on the concept that China was weaker than the U.S. Consequently, Washington 
could formulate an agenda that greatly distorted the balance of power in its own favor.  
Since reestablishing relations with China, Washington has utilized unilateral policies, 
while operating under a bilateral, and at times, a multilateral façade. This practice has 
become somewhat emblematic of U.S. foreign policy in the last three decades. Under the 
current Bush Administration it has been dropped altogether for a more outwardly hostile 
and explicit style of unilateralism.  
Beijing has always been aware of this distortion in its relationship with the U.S. In 
fact, since the 1970s, China’s leadership has consistently called for a multi-polar world 
order, in which China, among other states, would become a viable force buttressing U.S. 
influence in the international community.79 Once again, for those realists who view the 
U.S.’s preeminent position in the global community as a central security interest, the 
notion of a multi-polar world is rather alarming. Therefore, as China’s economic and 
military power continue to grow at a rapid pace, many U.S. policy makers, who are 
guided by these concerns argue that an increased level of containment is necessary to 
protect the U.S. against the possibility of China as a future aggressor. Populist politicians, 
who want to build massive trade and other barriers in a futile attempt to boost domestic 
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markets, now join the conservative hawks that maintain this line of rhetoric. 
Protectionism and containment are slowly encircling and threatening U.S. trade and 
commerce policies. It is submitted that continuing to implement these tactics both 
unilaterally and without and attempts to reassurance of good will have disastrous 
consequences for the future of this critical relationship.  
The following sections will provide an overview of the sources fueling these 
growing anxieties within the U.S. government, as well as delineating the opposing 
opinions between China and the U.S. on the issues stated above.  
SEC. 1: CHINA’S RISE         
For the purpose of better understanding the unique challenge China’s rise presents 
to the U.S., a review of its capitalist conversion is in order. Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) and trade, above all else, have been the principal forces driving China’s booming 
private sector, which is a major source of its economic growth. China’s capitalist 
transformation and economic success are more the result of its engagement with the 
international community than the domestic reforms undertaken to spur agricultural and 
industrial production in the 1980’s.  Thus, China is a product of the very system it 
threatens to unravel.  
By presenting China’s rise in this light it illustrates how much the country has 
benefited from its relationship with the U.S and the international community. Our 
economic dependence runs both ways. Unfortunately, increasing numbers of Americans 
are overlooking this critical fact. In part, this results from the mainstream media’s 
tendency to act more like alarmists than a source of information. The media often present 
the statistical figures of China’s rise in not only an intimidating and exaggerated light, but 
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also in a distorted context that addresses only one aspect of the relationship between 
China and the U.S. In many ways, because of China’s reliance on the investment of U.S. 
corporations, it is just as limited in the level of diplomatic force it can exert over the U.S. 
as the U.S. is with China. It is important to keep these considerations in mind when 
calculating the challenges and potential threat posed by a rising China to the United 
States. 
The remarkable success of China’s flourishing economy traces its origins back to 
the market reforms implemented by Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s and 1990s. When Deng 
came to power after Mao and the Cultural Revolution, Deng understood that China 
desperately needed to modernize its economy if it wished to compete with the newly 
rising Asian powers of Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and especially its age-old 
nemesis, Japan. Deng believed that China had to make a choice between modernizing its 
economy and infrastructure or facing the possibility of encirclement. The dilemma struck 
a cord with the nation’s historical sense of victimhood.80 A realist at heart, Deng chose 
the latter, even if it meant sacrificing the ideological base of Chinese Communism. His 
goal was to improve China’s real income and living standards by adopting an agenda of 
economic liberalization.81 Clearly, Deng had inherited the diplomatic pragmatism of his 
predecessor Zhou Enlai. It was readily clear to Deng that inducing modernization solely 
through domestic reforms, such as increasing agricultural production and accelerating 
industry, would ultimately fail to yield the desired results. The legacy of the Cultural 
Revolution, coupled with the years of backwardness resulting from China’s self-imposed 
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isolation, had devastated the Chinese economy and crippled industry.  Given these 
realities, Deng supplemented a program of domestic economic reforms with a program to 
increase foreign investment. This program was intended to develop industry and increase 
China’s level of participation in international trade. FDI and trade were the catalyst for 
capitalism and modernization.   
China’s economic development necessitated the adoption and maintenance of 
benign conditions within the international system that would ease the country’s transition 
from isolation to integration.82 For this reason, Deng focused his attention on China’s 
newly established relationship with the U.S. and finally moved to normalize relations 
with the U.S. on January 1, 1979. As noted in chapter two, concessions were made on 
both sides regarding the outstanding issue of Taiwan.  However, these concessions 
greatly favored the conditions set forth by Washington, thus setting the tone for an 
imbalanced diplomatic relationship. As a prerequisite for participation in the international 
financial community, China also had to agree to U.S. financial laws and trade regulations. 
Since Deng was in no position to negotiate, Beijing was forced to accept Washington’s 
"top down" demands. These early diplomatic interactions epitomized Washington’s new 
approach towards engagement with China.  
From the vantage point of the United States, China’s new commitment to market 
reform was a symbolic ideological defeat for China and a tremendous victory for 
American diplomacy.83 Nevertheless, it was a short-term concession that would produce 
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greater results for China in the long run. As noted in chapter 1, those economies, which 
make these types of major market reforms and enter the liberal capitalist system later on, 
generally tend to achieve greater benefits. China is the poster child for this theoretical 
assessment. The new Chinese capitalist economy, which now accounts for 16% of the 
world’s total current exports, can be authentically characterized as “made in China.” 
Despite the adoption of this liberal economic system, paradoxically, the political system 
still clings to and protects the authoritarian nature of the Chinese state. However, the 
great irony lies in the fact that a large part of China’s economic growth, was financed by 
America and other Western powers, staunch advocates of the liberal democratic freedoms 
associated with their own system, by supplying China with trade partnerships and large 
amounts of FDI.  
Deng used the neighboring city-state of Singapore as the economic model for 
China’s modernization. “In 1992, when Deng was trying to jumpstart reforms, he sent no 
fewer than four hundred separate Chinese delegations…to Singapore in a single year to 
marvel at what China would become if it modernized.”84  Singapore was and remains a 
thriving capitalist economy, ruled by a one-party system. Even today, Singapore 
continues to exude a strong reputation for its lack of freedoms and repressive 
government. In short, it was a smaller version of what China was to one day become. 
Deng imitated the Singaporean government’s heavily planned and state controlled 
policies for economic development, which emphasized the construction of modern 
infrastructure to attract foreign investment.85 Additionally, he implemented the same 
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loose restrictions on business that would increase exports and dramatically raise the 
standards of living for the Chinese people.   
In order to make ends meet, Deng adopted what became known as the “Open 
Door Policy”, which was intended to promote a favorable environment that would attract 
FDI and increase trade. China’s contemporary, thriving private sector, which currently 
attracts over $500 billion in FDI, can trace its foundational origins to this early 
program.86  Under this policy, Deng set up “special economic zones” (SEZ) that fostered 
a business environment attractive to foreign investors. SEZ regulations stipulated that the 
products of participating enterprises were to be primarily exports; investors were 
promised freedom in management of their enterprises; all raw materials and capital goods 
could be imported duty-free by participating enterprises; foreign enterprises received a 
tax holiday or paid taxes at rates lower than in other part of the country.87  Moreover, one 
of the greatest advantages for foreign companies to move factories to these zones was the 
abundance of cheap labor provided by Chinese workers. The significantly lower wage 
scale generated greater capital returns as a result of increased productivity, without an 
increase in the price of labor. At first these zones were limited to the peripheral costal 
areas across from Taiwan and Hong Kong. The purpose of this was twofold. First, it 
attracted investment from these wealthier neighbors. Second, it was a means of 
duplicating and innovating the effective production models that were flourishing in these 
provinces. Essentially, the SEZs were intended to ease the mainland’s transition towards 
capitalism by limiting them to the coastal regions.  
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Deng described the SEZs “as windows for technology, management, knowledge 
and foreign policy to better serve China’s modernization program.”88 However, the 
tremendous success of the initial five SEZ’s caused the number of these zones to grow 
exponentially across China. By 1984, these economic zones spread to fourteen cities 
along the coastal region.89 Limiting these zones to specific regions has the effect of 
greatly distorting the distribution of wealth, promoting drastic divisions in the standards 
of living across the mainland.  
Ultimately, the combination of the low wage scales in China and the increasing 
level of its skills and technology is one of the greatest challenges which is now fueling 
the possibility for long-range competition with the U.S. It is, however, more so the result 
of globalization, than any intrinsic advantage China’s economic/industrial model holds 
over the United States in terms productive capacity. Instead, China’s edge results from 
demographic factors. The much larger population of China, at least 1.2 billion people 
compared to 300 million in the U.S., means that China has an abundant labor force at its 
disposal, thus the surplus of cheap labor allows its to keep production costs low. At first, 
when China limited itself to producing inexpensive low-value products such as toys, 
staples and other things, the U.S. found Chinese imports beneficial. It was helpful in 
maintaining low inflation rates.  As China advances to higher value added products, 
however, such as automobiles, computers, aircraft and other items, the U.S is gradually 
starting to lose its productive edge. As a result, an increased rivalry is likely to develop. 
Given the high skill levels of the Chinese in such areas as mathematics and physics, 
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China is likely in the future to become a competitor in high-tech areas, such as the 
aircraft industry, that was once long dominated by the United States. Therefore, the 
increasing level of competition between China and the U.S. will largely be determined by 
which country continues to develop high technology so as to boost their productive edge. 
The United States, nevertheless, is confronted with the same challenges by India and 
other emerging economies. But, as it has been argued repeatedly throughout this thesis 
and will be further demonstrated in this chapter, by the sheer virtue of is size, its growing 
military capabilities, expanding diplomatic influence abroad, and purchasing power 
China is set apart from the others in respect to the challenges it presents to this country 
preeminence. It has the effect of transforming what is generally considered a bilateral 
economic struggle into a global power struggle that will greatly mitigate the landscape of 
the current international system.  
China’s level of openness to the international community during this period of 
economic reforms is extremely impressive and historically unique. The United States was 
far more isolationist during its economic boom, implementing an array of protective 
tariffs to safeguard its domestic economy.90 In China, however, the dramatic increase in 
FDI during the 1990’s through the early years of the twenty first century cannot go 
unrecognized. In 1992 alone 8,500 new investment zones were created.91  It is now 
second to the United States in the level of foreign investments it receives. In 1992 
following Deng’s promotional southern tour of his SEZs, FDI tripled to $11 billion, then 
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tripling again to $34 billion in 1994, and doubling to $61 billion in 2004.92  In 2003, FDI 
accounted for roughly forty percent of China’s overall GDP. Of China’s vast reserves of 
FDI, American investment totaled $70 billion worth in contracts in 2003, making the 
U.S. and its corporations China’s largest foreign investor.93
The large influx of foreign investment has been central to China’s emergence a 
major economic power because of its role in developing of the country’s industry and 
infrastructure. In 1978, one third of China’s industrial production capacity was financed 
by half a trillion dollars of foreign investment.94 Moreover, instead of using its own 
reserves to develop the country’s infrastructure and private sector, China uses the large 
sums of foreign investment at its disposal to fund its development projects.95 
Furthermore, foreign investment is responsible for boosting China’s extraordinary export 
performance, which has, in turn, made China one of the world’s largest trading partners. 
It has recently surpassed Japan.  
Trade has been an integral part of China’s superior economic performance in the 
past decade, as well as a flash point in its economic and political relationship with the 
U.S. It was central to Deng’s economic reform strategy and is presently the principal 
force propelling China’s annual growth rate of approximately 9.5%.  Deng wanted to 
move away from the Maoist model of national self-sufficiency by exposing China to the 
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benefits of participating in global trade.96 The influx of foreign investment from the SEZs 
provided the means for large increases in China’s export production and thus rapidly 
developed the nation’s trading potential. Between 1990 and 2003, China’s total exports 
grew eightfold to over $380 billion.97 Trade accounts for almost half of China’s overall 
economy and it has far surpassed the growth of its domestic economy. It currently holds a 
trade-to-GDP ratio of 70%. In its relationship with the U.S, China’s trading power is 
manifested in the current account deficit the U.S. holds with it. Essentially, the vast 
amount of liquidity at China’s disposal from FDIs allows China to save its own reserves 
generated from the country’s massive export industry. As noted above, China’s reserves 
currently amount to approximately $1.5 trillion and are still growing at rates between $40 
to $50 billion per month. Beijing uses this newfound purchasing power to finance 
investments abroad as well as a growing level of import consumption. Ultimately, these 
reserves and the manner in which China uses them have become a source of China’s 
expanding geopolitical influence in the international system.  
Those who view China as a potential strategic and security rival, within the U.S., 
are disturbed by these figures for several reasons. First, the vast liquidity and reserves 
that China has derived from its export activities, with reserves growing at a level of at 
least $200 to $300 million per year, China may now be in a position to outspend the U.S. 
on almost any issue.98 This is most worrisome in security matters, reflected in China’s 
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growing defense budget and resource competition, as China moves to seek closer ties 
with Venezuela, a critical supply line for U.S. oil imports. Second, when the massive 
trade deficit is set against China’s reserves, it contributes to the perception that the U.S. is 
making itself too vulnerable to China by conceding its superior position. Thus, China’s 
purchase of U.S. treasury bonds and its attempt to take over Unocal several years ago and 
its recent investment in several U.S. banks, such as Bear Stearns, and corporations have 
left many American officials uncomfortable, in spite of the fact that foreign investments 
have been a cornerstone of the U.S. financial system’s success.99 Third, many 
protectionist politicians argue that China is employing unfair mechanisms to boost its 
trading advantage, and indirectly its profits, in a manner that is harming critical sectors of 
U.S. industry, such as manufacturing. China, on the other hand, is well aware of these 
concerns. These disputes and accusations have left the Chinese highly suspicious of the 
United States’ actions.  
The exaggerated concerns over the possibility of a politically adversarial dynamic 
with China in the distant future is forcing these sentiments to spill over into areas of trade 
and commerce, even though it has nothing to do with these issues.100 It has the effect of 
creating a dangerous environment in which commercial disputes can turn into matters of 
national security. This was precisely the case with CNOOC’s (a state-owned Chinese oil 
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firm) failed bid for a stake in American oil firm Unocal.101 These issues are examined in 
the following section.  
SEC. 2: THE SEPARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS FROM TRADE AND 
COMMERCE 
 
China’s economic rise has greatly altered the dynamic of its relationship with the 
United States. In effect, it has brought greater attention to areas of competing and 
opposing interests. At the center of these escalating tensions is a tendency on the part of 
the U.S. to link political issues to matters that generally fall under the commercial realm 
of trade and investment. This trend is generally motivated by two additional factors to the 
ones cited in the previous section. The first is an increasing effort to use trade sanctions 
for the purpose of influencing other areas of Chinese government policy. It is 
representative of U.S. engagement policy. A unilateral mechanism is used to shape 
Chinese interests in ways that are conducive to those of the U.S. In the end, it is more 
successful in fueling Chinese resentment and xenophobia than having any substantial 
influence of domestic policy matters.  
In the past, the most poignant example of this was is in the area of human rights. 
Sanctions are still used as a coercive diplomatic stick. However, now they are being used 
to influence other policy in areas including trade and finance, as well as the sale of 
nuclear technology to rogue states such as Pakistan. Presently, the U.S. government is 
attempting to use sanctions as a means to influence the Communist leadership to revalue 
the Yuan.  Even though these actions fall under what is considered disputes in the 
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economic dialogue, they present unintended consequences for the political dialogue. For 
example, China’s staunch opposition to President Bush’s reception of the Dali Lama 
conveniently overlapped with Congress’s passing of anti-dumping legislation. The 
second concern stems from a mounting consensus amongst many politicians in 
Washington that China will one day emerge as a future security rival. Such misguided 
perceptions have prompted Congress to turn questions of financial investments into 
matters of national security.102 The difficulty in formulating a rational and cohesive U.S.-
China policy arises from the tension in separating economic and trade issues from 
security issues, human rights issues and purely domestic political issues. 
Since 1979, disputes over human rights standards have been at the center of the 
two nations’ diverging political views. Yet, the growing importance and benefits of 
trading with China challenged the traditional U.S. approach to this issue in the 1990’s. 
When any liberal democratic power enters into an economic and political partnership 
with a repressive authoritarian regime it is inevitable that there will be conflicting 
opinions surrounding human rights standards. Although, China is now a market-based 
economy, it is formally still an authoritarian power. The economic reforms implemented 
have not translated into greater political freedom for Chinese citizens as many had 
predicted it would deliver. There exists, as a result, an ideological gap between the two 
powers concerning the primacy of democracy, the implementation of the rule of law, and 
basic civil rights and freedoms.  
When confronted with any form of political dissent that may threaten their grip on 
power, the ruling elite in China systematically resort to the use of repressive tactics in 
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order to silence any opposition. Among many of the party’s blatant violations of civil 
rights and liberties, judicial conditions are the most corrupt. Trials are often politically 
motivated and, therefore, lack the openness that would ensure the deliverance of a just 
verdict. In 2005, the U.S. State Department reported that five hundred to six hundred 
civilians were imprisoned and charged with “counterrevolutionary activities” for 
nonviolent expressions of political views, which now is considered a violation of Chinese 
law.103 In addition, Freedom House’s 2007 report on Human Rights in China concluded 
that as many as 250,000 political prisoners lack trials altogether and were detained in 
government sponsored “re-education through labor camps”.104 Many of those who 
supported Beijing as the site to host the 2008 Olympics, in spite of protests from various 
human rights organizations, argued that it would motivate the Chinese government to 
improve the country’s current human rights standards. The recent arrest of Hu Jia, 
however, a Beijing based human rights activist just months before the ceremony, proves 
that the government will continue to use whatever means necessary to silent dissent so as 
to present a unified nation to the world.105 Beijing wants to present an orderly and stable 
society to the global community for the purpose of demonstrating that it is ready to 
assume a greater stake in global leadership, as well as attracting more investment.  
Clearly, these practices run counter to the liberal democratic order the United 
States has been attempting to build across the globe since its emergence as a major power 
following World War II. In the past, particularly following the brutal repression of the 
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Tiananmen Square protesters in 1989, the U.S. attempted to link the issue of human 
rights to trade sanctions in an effort to “punish” the communist leadership’s abhorrent 
human rights actions. This policy tool was consistent with the U.S.’s style of engaging 
China. When China grossly violated international conduct, it was punished with 
sanctions, as it was in 1989. Such a dynamic is representative of most diplomatic 
exchanges between stronger and weaker states. This tendency, however, is exacerbated in 
the case of the United States. It results primarily from an unremitting inclination on the 
part of this country’s leadership towards exercising its policy on a unilateral basis. 
Second, there seems to exist a “blind faith,” particularly on the part of our leaders, that 
there is some sort of intrinsic power advantage or benefit in a system of liberal 
democracy that boosts our leverage in exchanges with authoritarian states. It is 
respectfully submitted that this is one of the major flaws of American diplomacy because 
it appears to be based upon an exaggerated assumption regarding the power and scope of 
our influence. For example, some U.S. diplomatic strategists may be of the view that 
when China behaved according to international norms consistent with the standards set 
forth by the U.S. it has been further integrated into the international community. China’s 
ascension to the WTO in 2001 is often cited as an example of this practice.  
Despite this point of view, China’s critical role in global trade is probably more 
responsible for its WTO membership than any reward for good behavior. What is 
important, however, is that a fair amount of U.S. policy recommendations, including the 
view of the U.S. State Department that an increasing adherence, on China’s part, to 
international norms as a result of engagement with the U.S., has been a driving force 
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behind China’s integration into an array of multilateral international institutions.106In 
fact, the WTO fiasco under the Clinton Administration provides a strong 
counterargument to this example. In 1999, the terms of the WTO agreement set forth by 
the American delegation were extremely unbalanced. They were drafted in the favor of 
U.S. interest and greatly disadvantaged the industrial and agricultural sector in China. 
Many Chinese accused Premier Zhu Rongji of being a “national traitor”, comparing him 
to the despised emperor Qing that had subjected China to a century of humiliation at the 
hands of Western imperialists in the nineteenth century.107 Many leading members of the 
Communist Party argued against WTO membership on the terms stipulated by the U.S. in 
their attempts to “engage” China into the global community. Ultimately, it was China’s 
growing economy and the necessity to stimulate further growth through the increased 
trade opportunities and expanded network of partners a WTO membership would provide 
that motivated it to join this organization. In this respect, China’s engagement with the 
U.S. obstructed rather than encouraged integration. 
For these reasons, it is the view of this thesis that such assumption about the 
U.S.’s influence distorts the level of power U.S. policy has over shaping Chinese 
behavior. Thus, when China starts to act contrary to U.S. interests, there is a 
miscalculated belief that somehow the U.S. can unilaterally correct its behavior. Perhaps 
in the past this may have been plausible. Yet, given the decline in U.S. authority in 
matters of this nature, there needs to be a greater incentive for the U.S. to cooperate with 
our allies and act multilaterally within set institutions if we are to successfully persuade 
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Beijing to alter course on issues of human rights. Continuing to act unilaterally will only 
create more strife in this already tense relationship. 
Ultimately, however, the attempt to link human rights to trade only created deeper 
strains than the ones this policy tactic was trying to correct. China considered the U.S. to 
be infringing upon its sovereignty. Since one of the central features of Chinese foreign 
policy has consistently been its refusal to impose sanctions in response to what it 
considers the “internal affairs” of states, China concluded the U.S was infringing upon its 
sovereignty.108 The diverging opinions over what constitutes “internal affairs” and when 
it is legitimate to intervene in those affairs, has been a major source of the ideological 
differences that have given rise to a majority of the disputes between China and the U.S. 
in their diplomatic relationship. The issues of human rights and trade sanctions 
collectively fall under this umbrella. Within Beijing, the idea of linking human rights to 
trade was perceived as a grand scheme of manipulation on the part the Western powers, 
particularly the U.S, as a pretext to control China’s domestic affairs. Additionally, since 
China’s leadership regards sustained economic growth to be the most vital of national 
interests, any measures, such as trade sanctions on Chinese imports to the U.S. are 
perceived as a direct challenge to the well being of the nation. In turn, such measures 
create greater strains in the political dialogue between China and the U.S.  In this 
situation, Beijing perceives that it is being contained rather than engaged. 
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Invariably, the emergence of China as a major global trading partner in the 1990s 
rendered the use of trade sanctions an unsound policy choice for the U.S in its attempt to 
introduce a more acceptable level of human rights standards. The growing importance to 
the U.S. economy of trading with China, particularly the role of such trade in keeping 
inflation rates down, prompted President Clinton in 1994 to separate trade policy from 
the issue of human rights in the U.S.-China bilateral trade relationship.109 Today, it would 
be highly unlikely that the U.S. government would step up diplomatic pressure on the 
Chinese government regarding human rights issues through use of trade sanctions. China 
is no longer a substantially weaker economic power. Moreover, the existing trade deficit 
between China and the U.S. inhibits the U.S.’s ability to step up its pressure on political 
issues, such as human rights, by relying upon sanctions. Furthermore, China’s WTO 
membership makes it virtually impossible for the U.S. to impose such sanctions 
unilaterally. This is not to say, however, that the United States should abandon its efforts 
to encourage political reform that would allow for a more open society in China. Rather, 
it means that as U.S. economic power declines in relation to China’s, we must formulate 
new mechanisms of engagement and integration that place a greater emphasis on 
multilateralism, as contrasted with the traditional unilateral route. Alternative policies for 
addressing the conflicts over human rights will be further explored in chapter four. In 
order better to understand the limitations on the level of “tough love” diplomacy that the 
United States successfully employs with China, it is helpful to take account of the 
massive trade deficit the U.S. has accumulated with China over the years. 
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Currently, China’s mounting trade surplus with the United States has become 
probably one of the most important issues in the bilateral relations between the two.  It is 
a major point of contention in the strategic economic dialogue and trade summits. Since 
the 1980s, there has existed increasing trade surplus between China and the U.S. It 
continued to rise steadily throughout the 1990s. As the result of this mounting deficit, 
China is now the most important agent in sustaining the overall balance between the U.S. 
trade deficit and the inflow to the U.S. of foreign investment.110 Many officials are 
concerned that this leaves the U.S. in a subordinate position to China because of this 
increased dependence upon Chinese investment in the United States, especially the 
purchase of U.S. Treasury securities to provide the need for capital to fund the operations 
of the U.S. government. Thus, by way of example, in 2005, when “the U.S. bilateral trade 
deficit with China reached $202 billion, accounting for a record 26 percent of the total 
U.S. global trade deficit of $782 billion”, China’s growing trade surplus became a 
formidable source of tension in its trade relationship with the U.S.111 There is a general 
consensus amongst economists that, in order to rectify the trade imbalance and prevent 
the margin from increasing, U.S. exports to China would have to grow approximately six-
fold in comparison to its imports from China.112 These statistics have led many in 
Congress to peg China as a mercantilist trader and the primary culprit behind the growing 
rate of unemployment in the U.S., especially in the manufacturing industry.  
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The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has accused China of employing an array of 
questionable tactics with the intention of artificially increasing its exports in order to 
maintain the current trade deficit, sustain its trade leverage over the U.S. and generate 
substantial annual addition to China's holding of foreign currency in its reserves.113  Of 
these, the most highly contested issues include the undervaluation of the Yuan, the 
Chinese currency, as well as the violation of intellectual property rights. Ultimately, the 
reason for this growing trade surplus and the challenges it presents to the U.S. economy, 
are complex and multidimensional. These are issues that extend far beyond the subject 
matter of this thesis.  Nonetheless, what is relevant are new developments unfolding 
within the U.S. government that seek to address and resolve these outstanding issues 
concerning fair trading practices. Recently, a flood of new legislation has been introduced 
to Congress proposing higher barriers to Chinese exports and strong anti-dumping 
regulations.114 This trend suggests the U.S. is pursuing an alternative unilateral route to 
the current administrations’ insistence on utilizing multilateral organizations, such as the 
WTO, to promote a more balanced dialogue concerning the existing trade disputes.  
In the months leading up to the November presidential election, U.S. lawmakers 
have introduced various pieces of legislation that would impose tougher sanctions on 
China as a way of pressuring the government to revaluate the currency and address other 
areas of outstanding trade disputes. It is from the Democratic side of the aisle that this 
effort has been most persistent. Both frontrunners for the Democratic presidential 
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nomination, Hillary Clinton and Barrack Obama, are endorsing this tougher approach 
toward China.115 With the possibility of a recession still at bay, the Democratic Party 
wants to prove it will be tough on economic issues. In this thesis, I take the position, that 
such measures would be deleterious not only to the economic health of the nation and its 
trade relationship with China, but also to the political relationship between China and the 
U.S. as well. Such measures will ultimately deteriorate the existing good will between 
China and the U.S. and contribute to growing levels of hostility between the two states. 
The language of this new legislation is dangerously protectionist and has the effect of 
sending mixed messages to China.  
Christopher Padilla, the deputy undersecretary of commerce, recently remarked:  
 
Such measures run the risk of inflating consumer prices at a time of economic 
uncertainty, bringing about trade retaliation that would stifle our exports, and 
setting back efforts to promote reform in China -- while doing nothing to reduce 
the bilateral trade deficit.116
 
The implementation of such legislation would advance the perception in China that the 
U.S. is attempting to contain its rise, creating an adversarial environment brooding 
mistrust, not only for economic but also diplomatic exchanges.  Additionally, acting 
unilaterally on this issue may create greater problems for the U.S. beyond is relationship 
with China. In particular, it could create strains in the U.S. /E.U. trade relationship that 
would be very harmful to the economic stability of the U.S. Thus, the U.S. should 
collaborate more closely with the E.U. in seeking a solution to these issues.  Moreover, 
because of the low wage scale in China and, on the other hand, the high level of technical 
capacity, Chinese manufacturing is likely, on a continuing basis, to undercut 
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manufacturing costs in the U.S. regardless of the exchange level between the Yuan and 
the dollar. Therefore, passing such legislation would do little to solve the problem at 
hand, while fueling sentiments of xenophobia and suspicion in Beijing that will get in the 
way of more pressing diplomatic disputes. 
If the Democrats want to prove that they hold an alternative view to the Bush 
Administration on the potential threat posed by China, they must first represent that threat 
correctly. First of all, the increasing importance of the economy to constituents in this 
presidential election has little to do with the level of Chinese exports to this country. 
Rather, it has more to do with the ramifications of the subprime mortgage crisis 
precipitated by the greed and poor judgment of the major banks of Wall Street, as 
contrasted with to the exploitation of unfair trading practices by China. This style of 
overzealous corporate governance has plunged the United States into an economic crisis 
far greater than that caused by the terrorist attacks of 9/11.  
Today, we live in a world where globalization is moving at a rapid pace and free 
trade is the modus operandi. Protectionism retards progress. Instead of instituting 
safeguards to level the playing field, this country needs to start investing more heavily in 
research and development to innovate and keep up. Competition in trade and industry is 
healthy. In the 1980s when the U.S. found itself engaged in a heavy competition with 
Japan, this competition had the effect of spurring industrial innovations and producing 
tremendous benefits. Frankly, this country has gone unchallenged for too long and the 
rate of technological and intellectual innovation has suffered as a result. The “China 
threat” is awakening a dormant industry in this country, in a way similar to the 1980’s 
“Japan threat”.  
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SEC. 3: RESOURCE WARS 
The strong emphasis these stated pieces of legislation are placing on restricting 
China’s exports to this country shows that the U.S. government is missing the point about 
the source of China’s economic power.117 It is not the increased competition in the field 
of trade that is the real threat to the United States, but rather it is the growing competition 
for energy and other finite natural resources that is most worrisome in the long run. In 
this arena, the fact that China is gaining greater leverage over the U.S. comes not from its 
ability to sell, but rather is growing role as an important global consumer and investor at 
a time when U.S consumption is declining.118 Thus, in light of this information, the 
revaluation of the Yuan will do little to harness China’s ability to outspend and out 
compete with the U.S. This outspending, for example, is most clearly reflected in Africa 
where the Export-Import Bank of China readily makes available huge, unrestricted 
funding for infrastructure projects. In return, it gives China the ability in large petroleum 
producing countries, such as Nigeria and Angola, to obtain large stakes in promising 
petroleum and natural gas projects.119  Therefore, this program of unrestricted imports 
from China helps to fund the country’s growing economic clout in the world.  
Accordingly, the business of imports has become China’s greatest diplomatic tool. 
China’s growing level of consumption of natural resources, such as petroleum, natural 
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gas, iron ore, copper and similar items, has made other countries dependent on it for 
investment.   
This is at the root of China’s growing geopolitical influence abroad. Furthermore, 
it has been advantageous in the race to secure energy supply lines. Presently, China and 
the U.S. have not yet entered into a fierce competition for natural resources. More 
specifically, neither one has tapped into the supply lines of the other. Nevertheless, the 
increased demand, compared with the relative supply of these finite resources, especially 
in regards to oil, has contributed to the perception that the emergence of a strategic 
competition between the two is highly probable in the near future. Moreover, the 
increased demand of China and India for natural resources and other commodities has 
substantially increased the cost of these items. When taken together with China’s military 
development, it is this fact that motivates realists and conservative hawks to conclude that 
China, much in the same way that the former Soviet Union did during the Cold War, will 
inevitably emerge as a security rival to the United States.120 Ultimately, the world cannot 
satisfy the appetite of both China and the U.S. at the current rate they are growing. These 
are issues that can be resolved only through the adoption of clear and innovative policies, 
the development of new technologies, including the greater use of hydrogen based power, 
rather than protectionist policies and "cheek to jowl" competition for natural resources. 
Such solutions are discussed in the following chapter. 
 Beijing’s program for modernization and economic growth has not come cheap. 
These developments are responsible for transforming China into the world’s second 
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largest importer of oil after the United States, with the most rapid growth in demand.121 
Its need for other finite resources such as aluminum, nickel, copper, and iron ore have 
risen from seven percent of world demand in 1990 to a forecast of forty percent by 
2010.122 The legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party, and its ability to preserve its 
power, depends on sustaining an annual growth rate of nearly ten percent, which creates 
about twenty four million new jobs each year.123 As a result, the pursuit for energy and 
resources to maintain the current levels of economic growth is now a driving force behind 
China’s foreign policy.  
 During an era of international relations that has been branded “the geopolitics of 
scarcity”, Beijing’s relentless quest to satisfy China’s insatiable appetite for energy is 
likely to draw it directly into strategic and diplomatic conflicts with the United 
Statesunless technological development can be harnessed to provide, new, plentiful 
sources of energy.124  The distortion between the growing demand for oil in relation to its 
limited supply is creating a debilitating impact on the balance of power within the 
international system. In relation to the diplomatic issues I address in this thesis, namely, 
those concerning nuclear proliferation and military intervention in the internal affairs of 
sovereign states, China’s necessity to secure petroleum supply lines is at the center of 
these disputes. Beijing’s need to gain access to increasing amounts of energy has a 
tendency to inhibit its willingness to collaborate with the international community when 
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its interest, namely, when its energy supply lines run the risk of being comprised.125 
Beijing has sought to fortify ties with suppliers that have been diplomatically isolated by 
Washington. Of these, China’s relationships with Iran and Sudan are the most notable 
because of the diplomatic power struggle they have inspired between China and the U.S. 
in the international forum of the United Nations. 
Nuclear Proliferation: Iran 
 Iran and the United States have been locked in a ferocious battle for regional 
dominance in the Middle East for years. The latest manifestation of this power struggle is 
the contentious debate surrounding the purpose and future of Iran’s uranium enrichment 
program. Since 2006, the United States, joined by Britain and France, has strongly argued 
that the purpose of Iran’s uranium enrichment program is to develop nuclear weapons. In 
a period when tensions between the United States and Iran seem to have peeked, 
combined with President Ahmadinejad’s incessant inflammatory remarks concerning the 
future of Israel, makes the prospect of Iran obtaining such technology worrisome to many 
American and Western officials. However, the Iranian government continues to maintain 
that its nuclear program is for peaceful civilian purposes.  
 Enlisting China’s support in confronting the nuclear proliferation threat posed by 
Iran is a far greater challenge for U.S. diplomats than in the case of North Korea. 
Working to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear program was directly in China’s interest. 
Yet in the case of Iran, for China’s leadership, it appears that the costs of confronting Iran 
on this issue would outweigh any benefits. China’s international behavior has not yet 
proved that it is willing to sacrifice its own interests for a cause from which it does not 
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derive economic benefit.  What is more to the point is that the strategic ties between 
China and Iran date back to the days of the Silk Road. In regards to trade, and access to 
resources, there has been a long and solid foundation between the two states. Thus, 
Beijing does not share Washington’s disdain for the Iranian government. Additionally, 
while China does oppose Iran’s development of nuclear weapons, it is not necessarily 
convinced that the program for uranium enrichment was created for this purpose. China, 
in collaboration with Russia, has used its veto in the U.N. Security Council to block 
efforts that would bring Iran’s nuclear program under the U.S. inspection regime. 
 Yet, the greatest factor obstructing China’s cooperation is its dependence on Iranian 
oil. In 2003, 13% of China’s oil imports came from Iran.126 Over the past four years, 
China’s oil procurement ties with Iran have been growing at stunning rates. In 2004, 
Sinopec, the state-owned Chinese Petrochemical Corporation, signed a $70 billion, thirty-
year deal to buy liquefied natural gas from Iran.127 This arrangement brought China’s 
total deals for Iranian petroleum to approximately $100 billion. On December 11, 2007, 
this deal was augmented when Sinopec committed another $2 billion to develop the 
Yadavaran oil field in Iran. This latter agreement followed through on a prior provision 
that had been set forth in the 2004 deal. In four years, the field will develop 85,000 
barrels of oil a day, with an additional 100,000 barrels a day in another three years.128 
This latest agreement was signed shortly after the CIA released a report, citing that it may 
have miscalculated Iran’s nuclear capabilities and intentions. Prior to the declassification 
of this report, China was on the brink of supporting the imposition of tougher sanctions 
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on Iran, which it had continuously resisted within the U.N. Securing closer cooperation 
with China on this issue now will be a tremendous burden for the next administration 
given China’s growing demand for oil supplies and its increasing diplomatic ties with 
Tehran. It is likely to be a formidable source of tension in the future course of U.S.-
Chinese diplomatic relations. 
The Debate over Military intervention in the sovereign affairs of statesÆ Sudan 
 Since 1997 the U.S. has implemented a policy forbidding American corporations 
from engaging in any business operations in Sudan as a consequence of the bloody war 
between the Muslim government in Khartoum and the Christian rebels in the south.129 
Shortly after 1997, China moved in to fill the economic vacuum in Chad left by the 
United States, thereby giving China access to the vast amount of Sudanese petroleum 
reserves to satisfy its increasing energy demands. Sixty percent of Sudan’s oil is exported 
to China.130 In return, China has supplied the Sudanese government with weapons and 
financed the construction of arms factories. As a result of its close ties with Sudan’s 
government, China has come under harsh international criticism for these actions. China 
has been accused of essentially underwriting the genocide in Darfur that has left at least 
300,000 dead. When China’s ambassador to Washington, Zhou Wenzhong, was asked to 
respond to these allegations, he said: “Business is Business. We try to separate politics 
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from business, and in any case the internal position of Sudan is an internal affair, and we 
are not in a position to influence them.”131
 Within the U.N. Security Council, China, joined by Russia, has repeatedly blocked 
any measures that would adopt tougher measures to stop the genocide. While China’s 
reluctance to interfere in the “internal affairs” of Sudan is consistent with the five 
principles of its foreign policy, in this respect, it is more motivated by its demand for oil 
than other considerations.  To a lesser extent, Beijing fears that interfering in these events 
may bring greater scrutiny on its own domestic abuses and violations of human rights. 
 These two cases, of Iran and Sudan, contribute to a growing consensus in 
Washington that China is developing a foreign policy that is actively hostile to human 
rights and international law, a combination that, on the surface, seems incongruent with 
U.S. foreign policy.132 Meanwhile, in China, the leadership refutes these attacks on the 
grounds that the United States is just as guilty of choosing which international laws to 
obey and which it can rightfully ignore. The 2003 invasion of Iraq is often invoked, as 
well as the gross abuses of power at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay.  
 The declining international power of the U.S. means it no longer in a position to 
impose standards it will not follow itself. More importantly, when considering the scope 
of these conflicts, it is critical to keep in mind that workable solutions to these disputes 
do exist. Chinese foreign policy is largely motivated by the pragmatic necessity for 
petroleum as opposed to some deep-seated ideological conviction in regard to these 
issues. In fact, China has recently adopted a tougher stance towards the government of 
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Sudan, which suggests that it may be altering course on this issue and responding to 
pressures by the international community.133This new development is given greater 
attention in the chapter that follows. Additionally, while the idea may be morally 
abhorrent, the U.S., in fact, benefits from China’s engagement with these pariah states. It 
is China’s willingness to deal with not only Iran and Sudan, but other states like 
Uzbekistan and Angola that help obstruct the possibility for direct confrontation with the 
U.S. In a certain way, it can be said that China’s access to these alternatives keep it from 
impeding on the supply lines that are vital to the U.S. interest, thereby preventing the 
occurrence of a strategic competition similar to the one between the U.S and the former 
Soviet Union during the Cold War. Therefore, U.S. policy makers find themselves in 
somewhat of a “catch-22” situation as regards China’s sourcing of petroleum from Iran 
and Sudan. Pushing China to take a tougher position on these issues with the 
governments of Iran and Sudan may alienate them from these supply lines, in turn forcing 
Beijing to seek closer ties with petroleum producing governments that are considered 
U.S. suppliers.  
Beginnings of a Strategic Rivalry in Latin America? 
 Yet, there are those who argue, however, that this scenario is already beginning to 
out in Latin America. China’s increasing ties with the government of Hugo Chavez in 
Venezuela is seen as a potential source of conflict with the U.S. in this respect.  Despite 
the fact that diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Venezuela have deteriorated 
significantly since Mr. Chavez’s ascendance to power, Caracas remains an important oil 
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supplier to the U.S. It supplies the U.S. with about three million barrels a day.134 In light 
of the growing demand for oil, Mr. Chavez has attempted to boost Venezuela’s 
international power by expanding the country’s client base. It provides him with greater 
diplomatic leverage over the U.S. By opening the country to new investors, he can 
effectively threaten to redirect the critical supply to the U.S. if the U.S. government 
should attempt to interfere with Mr. Chavez’s tight grip on power. Playing off the 
perceived power struggle between China and the U.S., Mr. Chavez has most actively 
sought to attract Chinese investment to Venezuela’s oil industry. On a visit to Beijing in 
2004, in his provocative manner, Mr. Chavez remarked “how he wanted to put 
Venezuelan oil at the disposal of the great Chinese fatherland after 100 years of 
American domination.”135 Shortly thereafter in 2005, he signed an agreement with the 
Chinese government that would allow for $3 billion of Chinese investments in 
Venezuela’s oil industry. The possibility of a strategic partnership between China and 
Venezuela is disconcerting to U.S. policymakers because satisfying China’s demands 
may result in limiting supplies to the U.S. However, it would also be an exaggeration to 
cite this example as China’s attempt to move into an important area of the United States’ 
sphere of interest.  
 It is critical to understand that the countries of South America are developing 
nations. While their growth may not garner as much attention as China, they too must 
find ways to finance programs for economic and industrial development. From this point 
of view, China is then more of a supplementary investor than a rival. But given the 
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anxieties in the U.S. surrounding the rise of China, coupled with the tendency of the U.S. 
to adopt an offensive position in matters of this type, it is unlikely that the U.S. 
government would adopt such a rational interpretation. Thus, China will most likely be 
viewed as a competitor as opposed to a partner in Latin America. 
 The solution to such complex problems can be relatively simple. However, neither 
China nor the U.S. seemed committed to pursuing such a route. For example, it is 
undeniable that a more effective energy policy would correct many of the diplomatic 
grievances existing between China and the U.S. regarding the disputes over nuclear 
proliferation and military intervention in Sudan. Additionally, it would limit the ability of 
rogue petroleum producing states from exploiting the international balance of power to 
boost their own national interests and global authority.   
 In the end, working to develop more sustainable energy policies could potentially 
be the most viable departure point for collaboration between the U.S. and China. Neither 
country is benefiting from soaring oil prices and the potential rivalry that is likely to 
develop as a result of the combination of: (i) higher price petroleum; (ii) increased 
demand; and (iii) limited and finite supplies of petroleum. For realists, it is this potential 
strategic rivalry over resources that could precipitate the possibility of a security rivalry 
between China and the United States. China’s implementation of these aggressive 
policies in its pursuit of these resources, coupled with its expanding military capabilities 
contributes to the advancement of this perception of China as a future belligerent. 
SEC. 4: SECURITY CHALLENGES: TAIWAN AND CHINA’S MILITARY 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
 It is clear that China’s growing economic clout is rivaling that of the United States 
in such a way that its effects are not solely confined to the boundaries of this bilateral 
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relationship. In the previous section it was demonstrated that Beijing now has “soft 
power” and a strong diplomatic influence extending far beyond its own regional 
peripheries.136 Thus, regardless of the pervasive domestic ailments that may prevent 
China from reaching a “superpower” status, it is emerging as a formidable force in the 
international system. Just as President Nixon so accurately predicted in 1972, no stable 
international order can be sustained without its collaboration. In this regard, China has 
the effect of challenging the conventional distribution of power within the current system 
that greatly favors the position of the United States.  
According to structural realism, these realities indicate that a security conflict 
between the U.S. and China may be inevitable.137 Realists and neoconservatives cite the 
considerable military build up within the ranks of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as 
evidentiary support for this theoretical claim. This fact is, in addition, one of the biggest 
elements fueling mounting concerns over the potential security threat China poses to the 
United States. 
Although China’s leadership has persistently claimed it seeks to preserve the 
character of its “peaceful rise”, at face glance, the statistics of its growing defense budget 
seem overwhelmingly to support the image of China as a rival of the U.S. as contrasted 
with a partner in security matters. China’s military budget has been growing at double-
digit rates for years with some figures indicating as much as an 18% rise for 2008.138 
What is troubling is not necessarily the expansion of China’s military, but that, as its 
                                                 
136 Hale 36 
137 Mearsheimer 47 
138 Ziegler, Dominic. "Reaching for a Renaissance." Special Report on China and 
its Region; The Economist. March 31st-April 6th 2007, (after p. 58; Report 
Inclusive 3-18). P. 6 
 83
power increases, the PLA remains extremely elusive about the extent of its capabilities. 
This tendency is consistent with the country’s overall approach to foreign policy. The 
Communist leadership remains ambiguous about China’s national objectives, presenting 
them in the form of cryptic slogans as contrasted with a clearly defined set of national 
security goals. Since the 1980’s the guiding principle behind the country’s foreign policy 
has been, “to preserve China’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, [and 
to] create a favorable international environment for China’s reform and opening up and 
modernization.”139 While these goals reflect the current pattern of China’s international 
behavior, especially within its own region, they leave many questions about its future 
intentions, particularly with regard to the political status of Taiwan, unanswered. 
The question of Taiwan, above all other security concerns, is most central to the 
stability of U.S.-China diplomatic relations. Currently, it is the only security mission 
posing a realistic threat for a potential military conflict between the two states because of 
the U.S.’s security obligation to the island set forth by the Taiwan Relations Act. China 
remains in stern opposition of the U.S.’ sale of weapons to Taiwan. Chapter two 
explained the origins of this conflict in great detail length. Today, while much of 
Beijing’s foreign policy is guided by pragmatism, the issue of Taiwan remains one based 
virtually entirely upon ideological motivations.140In part, this results from the perception 
that Taiwan’s continued separation from the mainland is a lasting reminder of China’s 
“century of humiliation”.141 With the disintegration of Communism’s ideological appeal, 
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the party’s ability to return the territories of Hong Kong and Macao to the mainland in 
many ways legitimized the authority of the Communist regime by reversing this historic 
“sentiment of humiliation.” Yet, the inability to reintegrate the government of Taipei 
remains a constant reminder of the Communist party’s shortcomings. The Communist 
leadership, as a result, continues to view the capitalist democratic government of Taiwan 
as a threat to its hold on power. As China’s economic success continues to deliver greater 
opportunities for social mobility, the government in Taipei presents itself as model for 
political dissidents on the mainland. As a thriving pluralist state, it is an attractive 
alternative to the current system of authoritarian rule in China, void of political freedoms. 
Beijing’s persistent demand for “One China” is, therefore, used as a nationalist rallying 
point to unify the country behind the party’s rule.  
Internationally, Beijing continues diplomatically to isolate Taiwan. It uses its 
tremendous purchasing power to advance this aim. In 2005, at the UN General Assembly, 
President Hu Jintao offered debt forgiveness and duty-free entry to exports from the 
world’s poorest countries, with the exception of those who recognized the government of 
Taipei.142 Since 1979, China’s official policy has called for a “peaceful reunification” 
under the concept of the “One Country, Two systems” formula outlined in chapter two.  
However, in March 2005, the Chinese government passed the “Anti-Secession Law”. It 
was for the purpose of codifying both China’s peaceful unification policy but also its 
willingness to implement “non-peaceful means and other necessary measures” to prevent 
the possibility of an indefinite separation.143 Ultimately, the unstated intention of this law 
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was to remind Taiwan that any claim for statehood would be interpreted as a declaration 
of secession, in which case Beijing reserves the right to exercise military force.  
Taken against the backdrop of this information, China’s military build up, 
especially along the strait, has many within the security apparatus of the U.S. government 
concerned that China is preparing for an invasion of Taiwan. The Pentagon estimates that 
China has significantly increased “the number, reliability, and accuracy of its ballistic 
missiles deployed across from Taiwan to roughly eight hundred, with about one hundred 
new missiles deployed a year.”144 Based on these figures, many military analysts have 
concluded that the balance of military power has tilted in China’s favor on the issue of 
Taiwan. It is the vast size of such a deployment that reaffirms this belief. A mobilization 
of this size would allow Beijing to disable the government in Taipei, disrupt 
communications and coerce Taiwan into some sort of negotiations before the U.S. Navy 
even had time to intervene.145
Conflict over Taiwan, however, is not inevitable. Furthermore, the likelihood of a 
Chinese attack in the foreseeable future is limited. Beijing has sought to develop strong 
economic ties with the government of Taiwan so as to provide a greater incentive to 
integrate with the mainland, much the same way the E.U. does with possible candidates 
for membership. Furthermore, the defeat of the nationalist party in Taiwan’s recent 
elections provides a brighter prospect for closer collaboration that could one day lead to a 
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peaceful reunification with the mainland. These developments are discussed at great 
lengths in the following chapter. What is rather disconcerting, however, is that in the past, 
the divergent opinions over Taiwan did not have the effect of triggering such inimical 
perceptions of one another in diplomatic exchanges between China and the U.S.  
This new trend regarding the diverging opinions over Taiwan is indicative of the 
perception within prominent U.S. government and military circles that China is trying to 
replace the U.S. as the dominant power in the Asian-Pacific region, a position the U.S. 
has held since the Korean War. Even though China has not yet fully emerged as a “peer 
competitor”, and there is no guarantee that it even will, the United States has already 
embarked on a path to contain that possibility.  
This strategy is dangerous because it has the effect of a creating tensions and 
fostering a hostile environment during a time of peace. In the past and present, the United 
States has demonstrated that it does not tolerate challenges to its regional dominance and 
has consistently acted unilaterally to preserve its power.146 On a grand scale, this was 
clearly illustrated during the Cold War conflict. Presently, and to a lesser extent, the 
United States is engaged in a similar power struggle with Iran to maintain its post in the 
Middle East.  
Now, there are early warning signs that the same scenario is playing out with 
China. When the U.S. moved to sign a bilateral military agreement with India, outside of 
the legal and institutional scope of the multilaterally organizations created to oversee 
such arrangements, concerns started to mount in Beijing over the possibility of 
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encirclement. Thus, the United States is equally guilty of the duplicity it accuses Beijing 
of in terms of security matters.  
This fact, combined with the mounting support for trade barriers against Chinese 
exports in Congress, contributes to the perception in China that, while the U.S. preaches 
engagement, it is clandestinely pursuing a policy of containment. From this viewpoint, 
China believes it must take measures to protect itself in the event of a conflict with the 
U.S. over Taiwan. China’s sizeable military build-up is one example.  
Consequently, while the U.S. believes it is protecting itself against a future 
adversary, its actions are ultimately self-defeating. The U.S.’s insistence to act 
unilaterally on these security matters, instead of pushing for greater transparency on 
China’s military capabilities within the apparatus of the multilateral institutions of which 
China is a member (such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the ASEAN 
Regional Forum), has the effect of deepening Chinese concerns of xenophobia and 
nationalism within Beijing that are becoming increasingly anti-American. By this, I am 
not arguing that the United States should ignore the sizeable build up of China’s military 
and its implications for future security relations. Rather, in order to maintain the stability 
and peace of the Asian-Pacific, a generally volatile region, this thesis suggests the U.S. 
should go about defusing this issue in a way that does not cater to China’s historic fear of 
encirclement by Western powers and its neighbors. In chapter two, it was demonstrated 
that Nixon and Kissinger were able to pacify similar anxieties in respect to closer 
collaboration between the U.S. and the former U.S.S.R. by exchanging critical military 
intelligence with Beijing to promote an atmosphere of trust. I will discuss viable 
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approaches to implementing alternative strategies in the present relationship in the next 
chapter.  
SEC. 5: ARE RIVALRY AND CONFLICT INEVITABLE? 
 This chapter has shown that the problems confronting U.S.-China relations cannot 
be categorized separately into economic and political issues. The picture must look to a 
whole series of other more critical issues, such as the increased competition and the effect 
it has on the price of energy, particularly petroleum and natural gas. These realities in 
turn, inspire diplomatic conflicts over areas, such as nuclear proliferation and military 
intervention, in which the political differences between the two states are deepened by 
their unyielding demand for energy supplies. Ultimately, none of these disputes mean that 
a security conflict between China and the U.S. is inevitable, or that it is even a possibility. 
Rather, it is indicative of growing strains and mutual suspicions that have the potential of 
creating an atmosphere of mistrust for future diplomatic exchanges.  
While these developments are relatively new and it is entirely too soon to brand 
them a pattern in U.S.-China relations, they are early warning signs that should not be 
overlooked. It is insufficient for the current administration to rely on China’s 
participation in the free market system to alter its behavior in a way that is more 
conducive with international norms. Yet, this alone will inevitably fail to produce a more 
amicable atmosphere for this relationship. This reality results from the most fundamental 
limitation inhibiting the integrating power of the free market system: while “trade 
increases the mutual economic dependence of the countries that engage in it, trade does 
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not make the peoples of those nations any fonder of one another.”147 Therefore, the 
United States must actively seek to construct a more acceptable forum for diplomatic 
exchanges with China that emphasizes multilateralism and, when possible, collaboration 
instead of unilateral policies and increased competition. Of course, such actions will not 
always be feasible. However, if the latter approach is adopted, when collaboration is not 
possible, relations will not dramatically deteriorate because of inconsequential disputes 
over minor commercial matters as they have recently.  
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This chapter provides a critical analysis of alternative policy solutions aimed to 
reduce the levels of escalating tensions between China and the U.S. Generally speaking, 
this thesis agrees with existing studies recommending that the U.S. should seek to limit 
the potential for future conflict with China by emphasizing both:  (i) our mutual interests; 
and (ii) the necessity for collaboration. At the same time, in the face of an obvious and 
increased level of competition with China, these policies must be formulated in a manner 
that incorporates strategies to safeguard U.S. interests in light of China’s growing 
economic, diplomatic, and military power. In the international system, this type of 
competitive dynamic between a “rising challenger state”, China, and the existing “great 
power”, the United States, is natural. At the moment, it remains unclear whether this type 
of ensuing competition between the two powers will give way to a direct security conflict 
or Cold War type strategic rivalry. Some observers have argued that this level of 
increased competition is an early manifestation of the type of power transitions that have 
the capacity to restructure the international order. 
Traditional realist theory indicates that, when this type of transitional dynamic 
emerges, namely one that heralds profound shifts in the global distribution of power 
among states, it is marked by periods of war and instability.148Proponents of this theory 
maintain that competition between states gives way to conflict and rivalry because the 
“rising challenger state” wants to enhance its newfound geopolitical power to restructure 
the existing system in a way that better serves its own self-interests. Naturally, the 
existing power views the rising power as a direct threat to its predominance and relative 
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security. As the rising states’ power increases relative to the declining position of the 
existing state, the possibility of war is enhanced resulting from the increased level of 
insecurity and mistrust amongst states. In a “unipolar” world order, such as the one today, 
the possibility of war or strategic rivalry amongst powers during a transitional period is 
exacerbated. The dominant states’ monopoly on power increases the likelihood that it 
will interpret a rising states behavior in a more threatening and adversarial light. 
According to his theory of offensive realism, John Mearsheimer argues that in this type 
of system a security conflict between China and the U.S. is inevitable because a great 
power, such as the U.S., “that has a marked power advantage over its rivals is likely to 
behave more aggressively because it has the capability as well as the incentive to do 
so.”149 This thesis opposes his view and argues that a security conflict between China and 
the U.S. is not inevitable. In this chapter, I seek to demonstrate why and how the U.S.’s 
response to China’s rise can override the predisposition of the international system to 
foster turbulence and conflict in similar circumstances. 
The first step in preparing such a response will require U.S. policy makers to 
measure any potential challenges China’s rise presents to the United States and the 
existing status quo of the international system against the forces limiting the scope of 
China’s international power. Presenting a more balanced and realistic image of China 
will help to reduce the possibility of those types of misperceptions responsible for 
precipitating conflict between states. Sound policies are based on reality, not the 
perception of reality. The first section of this chapter outlines the forces inhibiting 
China’semergence as a future belligerent. The analysis offers support for the alternative 
                                                 
149 Mearsheimer,John J.. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: Norton, 
2001. P. 26 
 92
view: in many ways China is meeting the Bush Administration’s demand that it become a 
“responsible stakeholder” in the international system.150 In this chapter, I maintain there 
are both internal and external factors limiting adventurism in Chinese foreign policy. By 
nature, however, these factors are extremely complex and diverse. Consequently, in order 
to provide a more cohesive analysis of the elements limiting China’s aggressive behavior 
and minimizing the risk of a security conflict with this U.S. in the near future, this 
chapter limits its focus to the growing levels of social unrest within the country as well as 
the economic interdependence existing between China, the United States, and the 
international community.  
Based on the evidence provided, I maintain that an outright security conflict 
between China and the U.S. in the near future is highly unlikely. However, given the 
heightened competition for natural resources and China’s growing influence its region, 
the conclusion is expressed that the same level of confidence cannot be reached when 
determining or predicting the prospects for a potential strategic rivalry between the two 
powers. While the realities of globalization make a Cold War type of rivalry unlikely, the 
U.S.’s response, if miscalculated, and Chinese enormous size combined would be 
powerful enough to reverse this trend. In the event that either power reaches the 
conclusion that the other constitutes a national security threat, both China and the U.S. 
share certain characteristics allowing them to advance their relative security position vis-
à-vis one another in ways that could pose negative consequences for the stability of the 
international order. In this respect, their massive economies allow them to “calculate their 
spheres of military, diplomatic, and economic influence. Each may be are prepared to use 
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military power to achieve national ends.”151Each country holds a historical conviction 
that its preeminent position in the world is preordained by destiny and serves as a 
mandate to strive for or protect this end.152Such qualities provide both China and the U.S. 
the ability to fragment the existing order into spheres of competing interests, that might 
give rise to the same type of violence and stability intrinsic to the power politics of 
nineteenth century Europe and the Cold War in spite of the intricate interdependencies 
facilitated by globalization. Although these traits make the present competition between 
China and the U.S. more susceptible to this type of strategic rivalry, they by no means 
make such a possibility inevitable.  It is, however, a “slippery slope.” Therefore, U.S. 
policy makers need to formulate and develop policies based on a realistic analysis of 
China’s objectives that narrows the room for misperceptions in order to prevent the 
current level of natural and necessary competition from “snowballing” into this type of 
destabilizing rivalry. The concluding section of this chapter is a critical analysis of 
existing policy recommendations seeking to enhance the positive nature and mutual 
goodwill of U.S.-China relations. 
 
SEC. 1: GROUNDING THE RISING CHINA 
Domestic Constraints on China’s behavior 
 The mainstream media is culpable of grossly exaggerating China’s capabilities in 
relation to those of the United States. Such a distorted representation of China’s 
economic success does not take into consideration the multitude of challenges that 
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threaten to offset its current course. Thus, when Americans read about China’s $1 trillion 
dollar economy, many mistakenly, but nonetheless erroneously, overlook the fact that 
China is still a developing nation. Therefore, in spite of its economic achievements, 
China faces the same domestic obstacles that confront any state undergoing a rigorous 
program of economic reform and development. Any sound assessment of the potential 
threat posed by China to the U.S. requires one to consider these basic realities.  
 In the course of the research for this thesis, I found that, virtually all of the 
mainstream publications (the major sources for informing American public opinion) in 
their discussions of the rise of China, invariably note that, provided China sustains its 
current level of economic growth, it will eventually surpass the United States as the 
world’s largest economy.  In a number of respects, such conclusions fail to note certain 
important qualifications.  Many of these articles neglected to mention that, if China does, 
in fact, manage to preserve its current levels of growth, surpassing the U.S. as the world’s 
largest economy is not likely to occur until 2035.153  Recent events, however, have 
clouded the accuracy of this estimate from several conflicting standpoints. On the one 
hand, since this prediction was made prior to the damage inflicted by the subprime 
mortgage fiasco on the U.S. economy, it presupposes the U.S.’s ability to recover from 
what has been branded the worse economic crisis in American History since the Great 
Depression. Yet, a relative decline in the U.S.’s economic position does not necessarily 
translate into increased power for China. There are other variables that complicate the 
equation. 
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It is too early to determine with certainty China’s future direction. It is important 
to note that in spite of its economic success, China is still undergoing a process of 
economic reform; the full conversion to capitalism remains incomplete. This fact presents 
China’s leadership with many internal obstacles. Still, the prospect that China will 
become the world’s largest economy is daunting for many observers. Such apprehensions 
are based on concerns that, as China’s capabilities increase it will seek to restructure the 
rules of the current system to its advantage.  
These concerns, while valid, are somewhat misguided for two reasons. First, even 
if China did manage to surpass the U.S. economically, per capita income within the U.S. 
would still be four times that of China.154 As a result, “China would then be the poorest 
“superpower” in world history.”155 It would not have the same type of consumer power 
generated from the U.S.’s domestic markets. Thus, any shock to China’s domestic market 
would have severe ramifications for the economic health of the nation. The recent effects 
of the credit crisis have illustrated this clearly. Beijing is now taking measures to boost its 
domestic economy to insulate itself from another further shocks from the international 
markets.156 A second reason to consider, when processing the implications of China’s 
ability to become the world’s largest economy is that this ability is conditional. China 
would become the world’s largest economy only if it maintains its current growth rate of 
9.5%. In the years to come, this will present China’s leadership with enormous 
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challenges.  Currently, every $1 of GDP generated requires China to use three times more 
energy than the global average and four times more energy than the U.S.157
When faced with soaring oil prices and the heightened competition for finite 
energy resources outlined in the previous chapter, it will become increasingly difficult for 
China to maintain the “peaceful” character of its rise while simultaneously attempting to 
satisfy its excessive appetite for energy and growth. If China is unable to curb its growing 
demand for energy, it may well be drawn into direct conflict with major international 
powers. China’s leadership is well aware of the strident necessity to avoid such a scenario 
because of the dire repercussions it would have on the Chinese economy.  The previous 
Chapter demonstrated how a more aggressive China in the international arena would have 
the effect of destabilizing important trade and commercial relationships, such as that with 
the U.S. Since trade accounts for over half of the Chinese economy, maintaining access 
to international markets is just as critical as securing energy supply in order for China to 
sustain its growth rate. As a result, even if China were to become the world’s largest 
economy, as the demand for energy increases in relation to its relative supply, China’s 
leadership would be confronted with fixing an increasingly inefficient system. 
 In essence, China’s internal challenges are emblematic of those confronting many 
of the up and coming “second world” countries, such as Brazil and India. Similar to those 
two nations, the benefits of China’s economic success have been distributed unequally 
across the mainland. Wealth is largely confined to urban centers, principally in the 
coastal regions, while the country’s more rural regions remain backward and almost 
feudalistic. Although China’s economic reforms have lifted about four hundred million 
                                                 
157 Hutton, Will. The Writing on the Wall: Why We Must Embrace China as a 
Partner or Face It as an Enemy. New York: Free Press, 2006. P.25 
 97
above the poverty level of U.S. $1 a day, it has also increased the disparity of wealth 
between the rich and the poor. Statistics indicate that the richest ten percent of China’s 
population hold 45 percent of China’s wealth, while the poorest ten percent hold only 1.4 
percent.158 Yet, China faces a burden that is unique among developing nations.  It is 
joined only by India in this respect. The sheer size of China’s population exacerbates the 
challenges to the current regime presented by such a degree of social inequality.   
Notably, the numbers of China’s poor are equivalent to the entire populations of the U.S. 
and Japan combined.159
 The social instability resulting from this gap in wealth is further enhanced by the 
creeping threat of unemployment in the country. China’s leadership has estimated that it 
must maintain an annual growth rate of at least seven percent in order to create enough 
jobs for its exponentially growing and urbanized workforce.160  The greatest threat to 
China’s future political and social stability, in this respect, is not the millions of 
unemployed peasants in the country, but the recent phenomenon of unemployment 
amongst college graduates. The high demand by foreign multinationals for cheap Chinese 
labor allows the government to create numerous jobs in the “low skill” industries, such as 
manufacturing. Jobs that require a greater level of intellectual merit, on the other hand, 
have been more difficult to develop. Although the enrollment of Chinese students in 
higher education has substantially increased, this trend indicates that better qualifications 
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have yet to translate into better opportunities. “The Chinese Ministry of Education 
reported that about 25% of the 3.38 million students who graduated in 2005 will be 
unable to find jobs.”161 In addition to this fact, those statistics, citing the hundreds of 
thousands of engineering and science students in China fueling its productive advantage 
over the U.S., often neglect to mention that only about one tenth of those students can 
compete internationally.162 The historical record shows that this type of displacement and 
dissatisfaction amongst a society’s student and intellectual populations is the breeding 
ground for political and social unrest and potentially rebellion.  This fact is most 
recognizable in the case of the Russian Revolution of 1917 and even in China’s own 
Communist Revolution in 1949. 
Social unrest is only one of the many domestic issues plaguing China.163  For the 
purpose of this analysis, however, it stands out because of the critical role it plays in 
limiting China’s international behavior. Social inequality is one of the greatest concerns 
for the leadership of any developing nation, especially one like China that is on a 
successful path internationally. It is the greatest source contributing to political turmoil 
and transition because of the fact that the impoverished groups may become resentful of 
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the leadership’s inability to distribute social and economic benefits equally. History has 
repeatedly demonstrated that growing unemployment rates, combined with a distorted 
distribution of wealth and a lack of social mobility, can single handedly derail progress 
and undermine a government’s legitimacy. Most recently, this phenomenon is once again 
unfolding in Latin American. The disproportionate numbers of leftist governments that 
now represent the region were elected on platforms promising greater social equality and 
employment opportunities across demographic lines.  
It is clear that the Communist Party has placed a high premium on maintaining its 
power. When this fact is combined with the potentially destabilizing threat to the current 
regime, of social unrest, U.S. policy makers can accurately predict that alleviating these 
grievances will be one of the top priorities for Beijing. Thus far, China’s Communist 
Party has been able to resist the transitional forces of democracy that generally 
accompany such a pattern of economic liberalization. With the erosion of Communism’s 
ideological appeal, the regime no longer commands affective loyalty from the people. 
The regime now relies on instrumental loyalty. Therefore, the government’s legitimacy 
now rests on its ability to deliver high levels of sustained economic growth and 
increasing the country’s international prestige. Recognition as a great power by the 
international community is a central demand on the leadership of China’s highly 
nationalistic citizens. Failure to deliver the goods is likely to undermine the Party’s 
authority. 
In fact, there are now early warning signs indicating growing unrest amongst 
China’s citizens and dissatisfaction with the leadership is on the rise in spite of the 
country’s high levels of economic performance. A survey from the country’s official 
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newspaper, The People’s Daily (which is, of course, controlled by the state), noted that 
70% of China’s people believed the gap in income was having negative effects on social 
stability within the country. The same survey also cited the peoples’ anger over official 
corruption and the mass accumulation of wealth it has facilitated amongst Party 
members.164 The Party’s continuous struggle to secure domestic legitimacy in spite of 
these growth rates can be explained by what Henry Kissinger maintains is “the 
incommensurability between a nation’s domestic and its international experience.”165 
From this viewpoint, he argues that “a nation will evaluate a policy in terms of its 
domestic legitimization because it has no other standard of judgment.”166 By this 
standard, if China cannot translate its international success into greater domestic 
prosperity as seen through more equally distributed opportunities and benefits, there is a 
significant risk that the regime will soon face a breach in its authority over the people. 
 The urgent threat which rising social unrest presents to the stability of the regime 
supports the conclusion that Beijing, at least to some extent, will have to divert some of 
its attention from foreign affairs to fixing these domestic problems. The size and 
importance of China’s own economy as compared with the global economy, however, 
will allow it to remain a formidable force in international relations despite these internal 
problems or its inability to achieve “superpower” status. Still, so long as these domestic 
issues threaten the Party’s power, they will command the leadership’s attention.  
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In this respect, Beijing has already demonstrated that it is willing to employ a 
greater level of assertiveness in its foreign policy to secure its internal position, even if it 
means risking international castigation for its actions. Its behavior in relations with Sudan 
is a case in point. Because of China’s need to secure petroleum to sustain its domestic 
growth, it casts a blind eye to Sudan’s human rights violations, even going so far as 
supplying Sudan with military weapons. Although recent event suggest Beijing is 
changing its position, its rigidity to a position of non-interference in the internal matter of 
states, when set against the state of unimaginable violence in Darfur, borderlines criminal 
negligence. Moreover, the coercive suppression of political activist Hu Jia, only months 
away from the Olympics, is yet another example of the priority which the Party places on 
preserving its position in spite of the unfavorable opinions its actions may generate 
within the international community. This proves that, even though portraying a positive 
image to the international community is a central motivation behind Chinese policy, the 
regime’s efforts to defend its own power outweigh the latter. Any effective form of 
American diplomacy must factor in these motivations that influence China’s behavior.  
 On the other hand, one could persuasively argue that these social grievances in 
fact, heighten, rather than limit the possibility for conflict with the U.S. on two counts: 
(I)  It can be plausibly maintained that China’s necessity to maintain its 
current growth rate in order to deter further social unrest will only fuel 
greater competition for energy sources with the United States. This suggests 
that China’s energy demand will continue to guide its foreign policy for the 
purpose of sustaining its economic growth. For this reason, it is in the 
national interest of the United States to develop alternative sources of 
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energy. Nevertheless, this counterpoint neglects to consider a critical fact, 
namely, that, in spite of China’s continued economic success, social unrest 
is still on the rise. Most recently, this reality was clearly reflected in the 
domestic outrage reverberating through China over the Party’s inadequacy 
to alleviate the destabilizing ramifications as a result of the large-scale ice 
storms in early February. The fragility of China’s internal position and the 
pervasive regional inequality were exposed when millions were left without 
power in southern China.167 This region’s demographic is overwhelmingly 
represented the poor migrant workers of China’s coalmines. China’s 
increasing dependence on coal,resulting from high demands for energy, is 
forcing these workers to submit to long hours and poor, at time even fatal, 
working conditions. Feeling exploited and neglected by the government, 
these migrant workers are growing increasingly disillusioned and frustrated 
with the Communist Party. Therefore, if China’s leadership wishes to 
remain in power, it must supplement the country’s economic growth with a 
broader program of social reforms. Rectifying the depth of China’s social 
inequality and developing a viable program that is compatible with the 
country’s vast population will require detailed planning and close attention. 
By virtue of this fact, the complexities of such an endeavor will undoubtedly 
divert a significant amount of attention from areas of foreign policy. 
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Ultimately, an inwardly focused China is less likely to clash with the United 
States than an outer directed one.168
(II) A second counterargument, that China’s internal problems suggests 
negative implications for its external relations, stems from an established 
tendency amongst states facing pervasive domestic problems to divert the 
local population’s attention from these issues by provoking conflict with 
an external adversary. Presently, both President Chavez of Venezuela and 
President Ahmadinejad of Iran have targeted the United States as the root 
cause of all evils facing their respective countries. In reality, however, it is 
the domestic problems, precipitated by their management of their 
respective governments, that are responsible for the prevailing social 
unrest within those nations. Chapter three illustrates how certain U.S. 
officials, particularly in Congress, are likewise guilty of invoking this very 
practice by painting China as the primary culprit behind our staggering 
economy.  
Given this trend, it has been argued that, if the Communist Party’s 
position begins dramatically to falter, it may appeal to the nation’s fervent 
nationalism to sustain its leadership position. Under such a policy 
approach, Beijing would invoke the nation’s historic fear of encirclement 
by Western Powers, painting an image of the U.S. as an adversary that 
desires to suppress the rise of China and retain Taiwan for itself. The Party 
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would then portray itself as the only force strong enough to counter these 
attempts. This scenario would serve as a breeding ground for an inevitable 
security conflict over the island due to the consequent heighted tensions 
and mistrust. The strong forces of nationalism in China, coupled with 
brooding suspicions in Beijing of American containment, render this 
scenario plausible, but not inevitable. 
 In this case, China would have to launch a preemptive strike 
against Taiwan in order to elicit an American response. Such an attack 
would have a deleterious effect on China’s international standing. At the 
present moment, China appears to be too integrated with, and benefits too 
much from, the system to risk such aggressive behavior.  Furthermore, in 
its pursuit of Taiwan’s integration, China has emphasized economic 
cooperation over more coercive tactics to meet its objective of 
reunification. The Pentagon, however, in it militaristic fashion, tends to 
exaggerate the scope of China’s adoption of coercive methods, while 
downplaying any constructive economic ties between Taiwan and the 
mainland. If the U.S. were to base its policies solely on reports from the 
Pentagon, we would be in a perpetual state of war. 
Evaluating China’s rise against its dependence on the international community 
will better illustrate the limitations restraining the country’s level of foreign adventurism, 
which has inadvertently contributed to an adversarial image of China in the United States.  
International Constraints on China’s Behavior 
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 The previous chapter examines the extent to which China’s economic prosperity 
is a direct result of its exposure to, and integration with, the global economy, as well as 
its increased participation in its respective institutions. Thus, while the current system is 
responsible for transforming China into a geopolitical force, China remains equally 
dependent on the system to sustain is newfound prowess. The fact that foreign trade 
accounts for seventy percent of China’s overall GDP reflects the scope of this 
dependence. The subsequent effect of the U.S. credit crisis on China’s domestic markets 
also supports this claim. China’s economic growth, therefore, depends on its ability to 
maintain amicable relations with foreign investors and its major trading partners, namely, 
the United States and the European Union. In spite of the United States’ declining 
economic superiority, China still remains heavily dependent on its access to U.S. 
markets. Therefore, the level of China’s assertiveness in its foreign policy is measured 
against an obvious reality: any actions, such as an invasion of Taiwan, that would elicit a 
political backlash within the U.S. prompting it to close its markets to Chinese imports. 
This would have debilitating results for China’s internal position in that it would stagnate 
economic growth and cause unemployment rates to soar. These are two scenarios that run 
counter to China’s national interests and this thesis has demonstrated extensively that 
China is a state that overwhelmingly acts in accordance with its own interests.  
 The growing level of assertiveness in Chinese foreign policy is indicative of its 
desire to assume a bigger role, not only as a regional force, but also a world power. If 
these early years of the twenty first century are any indicator, China is on a steady path to 
securing this position. The way to the top, however, requires increased participation in 
international organizations. China’s integration into a growing number of international 
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organizations (outlined in Appendix I), demonstrates a greater incentive to achieve its 
goals by cooperating with the system rather than taking coercive measures to impose its 
demands. Its participation not only in the WTO, but also various security treaties and 
organizations including, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, is representative of this 
behavior.169 The possibility of receiving an invitation to join the G-8 also motivates 
China’s leadership to act as a responsible partner as contrasted with a petulant state, 
motivated solely by its own self interest in the international system. China’s efforts to 
persuade the government of Sudan to accept the largest peacekeeping force in Darfur 
indicates a growing flexibility with respect to its longstanding position of non-
interference in the sovereign affairs of states.  This, in turn,  represents the influence of 
the international community in altering China’s aggressive behavior. This development is 
further explored in section two below. 
Factors Limiting the Risks for a Security Conflict over Taiwan 
 In a special report regarding the rise of China, Dominic Ziegler makes reference 
to the argument by a prominent Chinese scholar, David Lampton, that nations use three 
means to achieve their national goals: (i) coercion; (ii) material inducement; or (iii) 
intellectual motivation. Loosely translated, this can be interpreted as guns, money, and 
ideas.170  Ziegler argues, in accordance with Lampton’s view, that the manner in which 
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rising nations use these three provides tremendous insight for the type of power a nation 
is likely to become in the future. Observing China’s behavior in its own region reveals a 
greater tendency to emphasize “money and ideas” over “guns” in Beijing’s effort to settle 
its territorial disputes and peacefully to resolve the tensions that have generally 
characterized this region. With respect to the issue of Taiwan, the evidence provides 
further support for the image of China as a responsible and cooperative power, as 
contrasted with belligerence.   
In spite of the Peoples Liberation Army’s (the “PLA”) expanding military 
capabilities, Beijing understands that, in order to foster the continuation of China’s 
economic success, the preservation of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific is a 
fundamental requirement. From this viewpoint, provoking a security conflict with Taiwan 
would run counter to China’s interests. In this respect, China has taken a number of 
measures that endorse the legitimacy of its claims, which demonstrate that it seeks to 
promote the reunification of Taiwan to the mainland by peaceful means. Moreover, 
Beijing actively promotes cross-strait investment and trade in order to deepen its 
economic ties with Taiwan. In 2002, China surpassed the United States as Taiwan’s 
number one export destination.171
The logic behind deepening these economic ties is similar to the one used by Jean 
Monnet when he laid the foundation for the creation of the European Economic 
Community (EEC) in 1957. The theory was that, as a result of deeper economic 
integration, there would be an increased level of shared interests among the EEC’s 
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members. In some form or another, these interests would inevitably overlap with political 
and security matters. It followed that these mutual economic interests would provide 
greater incentive for increased political collaboration in areas where such interests were 
not mutually exclusive. The position was that, over time, deeper economic ties would 
enmesh the political and security systems of the EEC’s member. While there may still be 
some measure of debate whether the E.U. has a common foreign and security policy and 
political system, it is undeniable that the system, that gave birth to first the European 
Economic Communities, and then the European Union, has played a major role in 
contributing to the absence of violent power struggles and bloody wars, that had beset 
Europe for more than a century. In hindsight, it is easy to forget the historic antipathy 
between Germany and France which threatened to undermine this development. It is very 
important, however, to keep this fact in mind when assessing the forces threatening to 
obstruct Taiwan’s integration into the mainland.  
Even if deeper economic integration does not lead to reunification, it does greatly 
deter the possibility of a security conflict. This reality was reflected during Taiwan’s 
recent elections in January. The Kuomintang Nationalist Party (which was the principal 
opponent of Mao’s Communist Party and the architect of Taiwan’s separation from the 
mainland) won almost three-quarters of the seats in Parliament. As of late, it has operated 
on a platform that advocates maintaining the status quo between China and Taiwan 
without ruling out eventual reunification. Their victory limits the influence of current 
President Chen Shui-bian and his Democratic Progressive Party, that has outwardly 
provoked China and put the United States in a precarious position with his efforts to 
promote a strong national identity for Taiwan. Many analysts have interpreted President 
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Chen’s poor electoral performance as a rejection of his hostile approach towards China. 
But more importantly, one New York Times Article reports: 
Analysts also said some Taiwanese feared that Mr. Chen’s approach was preventing the 
island’s businesses from profiting fully from the mainland’s economic boom. Voters 
apparently decided that the strategy had garnered few economic benefits for Taiwan and 
may have isolated it further politically.172
 
Thus, these recent developments in Taiwan suggest that: (i) its citizens are placing a 
greater priority on sustaining the country’s economic prosperity by maintaining peace 
with China; and (ii) this policy is taking greater preference over nationalist demands for 
statehood that would provoke a security conflict. In their assessment of the potential for 
conflict over Taiwan, U.S. policy makers, in order to gain greater insight, should pay 
closer attention to these new developments in cross-strait relations rather than the 
Pentagon’s reports of the PLA’s military development. 
Taken together, this economic integration approach by China suggests a pattern of 
behavior that qualifies as that of a “rational and responsible” power. Such powers 
traditionally act in accordance with their national interest, developing a pattern of 
behavior that is predictable and easy to interpret.  
At the current moment and for the foreseeable future China benefits tremendously 
from the status quo. Therefore, assuming China is a rational and responsible power, 
overturning the current system or provoking a strategic rivalry or security conflict with 
the United States seems unlikely since it runs counter to China’s national interest. In fact, 
Chinese critics of the Bush Administration argue: “that it is not China but the United 
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States that is a nation which [seeks to] alter the status quo.”173 Given the recent trajectory 
of U.S. foreign policy these accusations fall on ample grounds. 
Still, there remains a looming suspicion on the part of the U.S. that questions the 
credibility of China’s commitment to international cooperation despite these constructive 
aspects of Chinas behavior regionally and internationally. Is it simply a continuance of 
Deng’s instructions for the country to “bide its time, but also get some things done in the 
meantime,” some grand scale act of deception?174 More specifically the question remains 
whether China is cooperating only until it is strong enough to overturn the system. I 
would argue that these accusations are largely based on paranoia that China is attempting 
to replace the U.S.’s dominant role in the Asia-Pacific, as contrasted with a more 
substantial motive to support the stability of the system. Nevertheless, there are many 
legitimate forces, namely, China’s growing demands for energy sources, that may 
undermine China’s commitment to the international system as well as its relationship 
with the United States. To resolve these on a mutually satisfactory basis, I submit that it 
would be in the best interests of the United States to pacify the growing tensions in its 
relationship with China now before they reach a point of no return.  
SEC. 2: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS 
Under the current Bush Administration, a framework was set forth in 2005 by 
former Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick that works towards the end of making 
China a more “responsible stakeholder” in the international system. While there have 
been several important instances of diplomatic collaboration, such as the Six Party Talks 
with North Korea, the Bush Administration has developed this policy more in the form of 
                                                 
173 Shirk 108 
174 Ziegler 4 
 111
deepening China’s integration into the international markets.The underlying assumption 
is that an increased level of economic dependence will provide a greater incentive for 
cooperation on an array of diplomatic issues. The CATO Institute, in accordance with the 
organization’s staunch faith in the “hard” power of the free market system, supports this 
method. In fact, it strongly advocates on behalf of developing closer trade ties with China 
for the purpose of achieving a more “cooperative and constructive relationship” with 
Beijing.175
This recommendation and the Bush Administration’s approach towards 
engagement with China, however, needs to be revised. Although U.S. policy makers 
should resist the allure of protectionism that has recently descended upon Congress 
through an effort to erect higher barriers and anti-dumping regulations to impede imports 
from China, trade and particularly restrictive trade procedures should not be the departure 
point for improving this relationship.  
Despite the collaborative efforts between China and the U.S. during the Six Party 
Talks to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear program, both powers continue to emphasize 
economic dialogues over diplomatic and security ones. To reiterate an earlier argument, 
while trade increases economic co-dependence between states, it does not have the same 
impact on their diplomatic exchanges. In fact, it tends to have somewhat of an adverse 
effect. Economic co-dependence, in relationships such as the one between China and the 
United States, has stimulated resentment and suspicion as a result of some perceived 
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vulnerability of one of the states to actins on the part of the other state.176 Furthermore, if 
China does one day emerge as a future adversary, this approach provides no insulation 
against such a threat, while continuing to strengthen China’s economic capabilities.177 
Increased economic integration neither prevents nor corrects the misperceptions that 
increase the risk of war amongst international powers.  
In order to avert this possibility in the future, any form of greater economic 
integration must be accompanied by increased communication regarding pressing 
diplomatic and security matters. Currently, China and the U.S. hold an array of annually 
occurring official U.S.-China bilateral dialogues. These include: The Joint Commission 
on Commerce and Trade; the U.S.-China Joint Economic Committee; The U.S. China 
Joint Commission on Science and Technology; The U.S. China-Economic Development 
and Reform Dialogue; and The U.S.-China Energy Policy Dialogue. In 2005 and 2006 
the U.S. Chinese Senior Dialogue and the U.S. Chinese Strategic Economic Dialogue 
were added to this list.178 A common theme amongst these dialogues is an emphasis on 
economic and commercial issues. The obvious dialogue missing from this list, and 
perhaps the one that is most needed, is one concerning military and defense issues. 
Since the demise of the Soviet Union, the political relationship between China 
and the U.S. has taken a backseat to the economic one. When examining U.S.-China 
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relations it is almost impossible to separate the issues into such rigid categories. 
Nevertheless, it true that, in the last decade, a greater emphasis has been placed upon 
matters concerning trade and finance between the two countries within both the U.S. 
government apparatus and the mainstream media. When the mutual threat of the Soviet 
Union evaporated it had the effect of leaving a tremendous vacuum in this relationship. 
For almost twenty years, containing the threat of a Soviet invasion had served as the 
primary motivation for collaboration between China and the U.S. In the absence of such a 
threat, the tremendous cultural and political divide that existed between the U.S. and 
China was readily exposed. Yet, the process of economic liberalization and development 
in China offered a discernible solution to this problem. China’s transformation towards 
free-market capitalism provided a new incentive for collaboration between Beijing and 
Washington regardless to the gaps in political and cultural values.     
As China emerges as a global power, the challenges it presents to the U.S. are 
tempered with greater opportunities for collaboration, reaching beyond commercial 
interests to diplomatic and security matters. Contrary to the belief among prominent 
circles of U.S. policy makers, today China’s interests are more compatible with those of 
the U.S. than they were during the Cold War era. The reality of this statement is often 
overlooked because of an American tendency to exaggerate areas of competition with 
those states we perceive to be potential rivals. Yet, from the data provided in the previous 
chapter, it is undeniable that neither country is benefiting from: soaring oil prices; the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons in an age of global terrorism; or the potential of a 
security conflict in the Asia-Pacific region. The next U.S. President should embark upon 
a policy of encouraging high-level diplomatic exchanges with China, like those between 
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Zhou and Kissinger, that explicitly articulate the areas of mutual interests between the 
two nations. Such regularly occurring dialogues should seek to reestablish a level of trust 
that has diminished and given way to greater suspicion between our two nations. 
Although this may seem trivial, the exchanges between Kissinger and Zhou Enlai in 1972 
reflect how central the existence of mutual trust is to the success of such high level 
diplomatic exchanges. The Senior Dialogue is a beginning step for this process. 
Promoting greater cooperation on these issues will help to balance the competing 
interests that threaten to tilt the dynamic of this relationship towards a strategic rivalry. A 
policy that places a greater emphasis on multilateralism should be used to address areas 
of competing interests, thereby shielding U.S. interests against the future risks of China’s 
rise. Keeping more coercive and unilateral “hedging” tactics at a minimum would be best 
suited to achieve these ends. Using this general approach as a sounding board, the 
following subsections provide specific details of such a policy in relation outstanding 
disputes cited in chapter three. 
Specific Policy Recommendation for Selected Areas of Competing Interests 
Security Challenges: The future of Taiwan and China’s Military Development 
Highlights for Security Challenges 
• Problem does not lie directly with U.S. or Chinese Policy vis-à-vis Taiwan; 
American insecurity rests in increased capabilities of PLA and sizable deployment 
along the strait; policies should focus on this 
• Establish an official bilateral Senior Dialogue that specifically addresses security 
and defense issues 
• Fill post for U.S. Ambassador to ARF to watch China’s security interactions in 
region 
• Petition as a joint venture with the E.U. to become an observer of SCO  
• In “hedging” tactics place greater emphasis on renewing commitment to the 
development of the region through aid rather than strengthening military alliances 
• Restructure World Bank and IMF to make them more effective in this endeavor 
• Make this central focus of bilateral relations with Japan and South Korea rather 
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than military agreements 
• Realistic assessment of China’s power in the region is necessary, source is “soft” 
not “hard” military capabilities 
 
 There is little room for flexibility with respect to U.S. policy on the issue of 
Taiwan. The United States is committed to the defense of Taiwan because of its security 
obligations set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act.179 China and the U.S. have avoided 
escalating tensions over this issue until very recently. This suggests that the problem does 
not lie directly with U.S. or Chinese policy vis-à-vis Taiwan, but elsewhere. In the pursuit 
of reducing tensions over this issue, the next U.S. administration should isolate the 
factors that have contributed to growing strains in relations over this issue. It is submitted 
that the increased capabilities of the PLA and the sizeable deployment of its forces along 
the strait are a leading cause of American insecurity over the possibility of potential 
conflict. Therefore, it would be wise to take measures that rectify these concerns before 
making any changes to U.S. Taiwan policy, which has proved to be quite successful up 
until these new developments in the Chinese military.  
 The first step in addressing the anxieties, that are fueling mutual suspicions and 
driving mistrust in both China and the U.S relating to security and defense issues, would 
be to establish an official bilateral dialogue, similar to the existing ones, that deals 
exclusively with military and defense issues. This would allow for a greater level of 
transparency that is currently missing. In addition to this bilateral dialogue, the U.S. 
should take a more active interest in the multilateral regional organizations of which 
China is a member. China has been a member of the region wide security organizations, 
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), since 1994. In 2004, for example, Beijing proposed 
                                                 
179 See Appendix II for language of the commitment in Taiwan Relations Act 
 116
that ARF begin to address military issues and was the site for the first exchanges between 
defense officials of the organizations members. The newly created post of a U.S. 
ambassador for ASEAN affairs allows the United States to play a more proactive role in 
the development of China’s security relations in the forum of this multilateral 
organization.180 Moreover, it allows the U.S. a better opportunity for observing China’s 
behavior in pursuit of its regional security interests and facilitates effective formulation 
by the U.S. of policies to deal with this issue.   
 The U.S. should also seek to enhance ties with other Asian security institutions, 
such as The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), in which China is joined by 
other rising powers like Russia. Traditionally, the organization has been seen as hostile to 
U.S. interests by many American leaders because of: (i) the high number of authoritarian 
states among its members; and (ii) the lesser stated goal of the organization that was 
mainly for the purpose of the Cold War undermine U.S. influence in the region. 
However, the collective threat of global terrorism gives the U.S. new opportunities to 
collaborate with China in the forum of this organization. Existing policy 
recommendations have advocated that the U.S. petition to join the SCO as an observer in 
order to coordinate more effective policies with the organization’s members on this 
issue.181 I would add, however, that the U.S. should pursue this initiative as a joint 
venture with the E.U. This approach would be more effective because it demonstrates a 
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genuine interest in multilateral cooperation. Approaching the organization unilaterally 
would undoubtedly fuel suspicions and elicit accusations that the U.S. was trying to 
“spy” on the group’s activities to make sure they do not undermine U.S. authority.  
 It is inevitable that any future U.S. security policy in Asia will incorporate some 
form of “hedging” to protect U.S. interests in the event that China should emerge as a 
future rival. In pursuit of such tactics, almost every existing policy recommendation 
places clear emphasis on strengthening the U.S.’s military alliances in the region. While 
some level of strengthening U.S. military action as will be necessary, it should not be the 
focus of U.S. policy.  There are two reasons for this suggestion.  First, making such 
abrasive tactics the cornerstone of U.S. policy would be ultimately self-defeating because 
they proliferate the risks of facing China as an enemy. Overstating the importance of U.S. 
military alliances with such nations such as Japan and South Korea in this approach 
would cater directly to China’s historic fear of encirclement. As a result, the Chinese are 
likely to interpret such extensive bilateral military alliances in their region as security 
threat and respond accordingly. The Chinese could then possibly proceed by expanding 
military deployment and development in the region or increase efforts to establish their 
own web of military alliances to offset those of the U.S.  
In this environment of fleeting alliances, the likelihood that China and the U.S. 
would enter into a type of Cold War rivalry vying for spheres of influence is very strong. 
In the event such an occurrence, the historically volatile nature of the Asia-Pacific 
coupled with the increased levels of mistrust and insecurity among states heightens the 
risks for the type of security conflict with China that the United States was trying to avoid 
in the first place.  
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 A second reason offered in objection to excessive hedging measures of this nature 
is that, once again, U.S. policy makers are misinterpreting the source of China’s power. 
The growing influence China is experiencing in this region that is threatening the U.S.’s 
traditional role as the dominant power is not the result of China’s expanding military 
capabilities. Thus, strengthening bilateral military alliances in the region only protects the 
U.S. against China’s “hard power”, which, for the time being and the foreseeable future, 
is significantly inferior to that of the U.S. On the other hand, this strategy does nothing to 
protect the U.S. from the consequences of China’s mounting “soft power”, which is the 
primary force behind its expanding role as a regional leader.  
 China’s massive reserves allow the country to boost its influence in the region by 
giving out supplemental aid packages to its poor neighbors, much the way the U.S. did 
after World War II. Cambodia and Sri Lanka are both examples of countries that have 
benefited from Chinese capital aid packages. In April 2006, China’s Prime Minister, Wen 
Jiabao, announced that China would dispense $600 million to the Cambodian government 
for the development of the country’s infrastructure. China’s aid package was almost 
equivalent to the entire international aid budget put up by such institutions as the World 
Bank and the Asian Development Bank, with an array of other bilateral donors.182 Most 
recently, China has quietly moved into India’s backyard to provide the Sri Lankan 
government with similar aid packages. According to one New York Times report, 
“Chinese assistance has grown fivefold in the last year to nearly $1 billion, eclipsing Sri 
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Lanka’s longtime biggest donor, Japan. The Chinese are building a highway, developing 
two power plants and putting up new ports…”.183
These actions are contributing tremendously to China’s increased credibility in 
the region. Traditional donors Western donors, such as the United States and the E.U., are 
now being replaced by the newly rich and rising Eastern Powers, such as China. 
Countries such as Cambodia and Sri Lanka appreciate Chinese funds because “when 
China gives, it doest say do this or do that. [The recipient states] can do whatever [they] 
want with the money.”184 The aid packages that such countries receive from international 
institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank along with individual Western powers, 
usually come with various demands and conditions that limit the recipients’ ability to use 
these funds freely.  
If the U.S. wants to keep a strong foothold in the region and bolster its faltering 
influence against China’s growing diplomatic power, it must focus on deepening regional 
ties through increased aid programs. Moreover, renewing the U.S.’s commitment to 
developing the region, a program  that it initiated after the Korean War, is a much less 
aggressive and outwardly confrontational tactic than exclusively pursuing a strategy that 
deepens bilateral military ties.  
Problematically, however, the U.S. does not have the same amount of reserves 
that it did after World War II, which allowed it to initiate such effective economic aid 
programs as the Marshall Plan. Arguably, it was these programs, more so than our 
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military bases in Europe and Asia, that legitimized our authority as a regional hegemony. 
Therefore, despite the limitations of the U.S.’s faltering economy on its diplomatic reach, 
it is submitted that the U.S. it must pursue venues allowing it to maintain a post of “soft 
power” in the region. The best course of action would be one that works closely with 
India and Japan to increase aid packages in the region. Any future “hedging” strategy 
should incorporate this “soft power” aid program.  Deepening our military alliances with 
Japan and India should be secondary to this primary “soft power” approach.  Japan still 
has a formidable amount of capital liquidity at its disposal as a result of its towering 
reserves. 
Yet any such efforts must be paralleled with increased packages of international 
and multilateral aid from institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF. This will 
require the U.S. to work very closely with the E.U. towards restructuring the governance 
of institutions, such as the World Bank and IMF, which have increasingly been criticized 
for inefficiency and ineffectiveness.  Part of these reforms must include a release by the 
U.S. and the major E.U. ember States, of their oligarchic control of such institutions and 
providing China and other developing nations with a bigger stake in the leadership of 
these organizations.185 Excessively operating outside the scope of these institutions could 
lead to a scenario where smaller countries could play China off the U.S., Japan, and India 
in order to gain greater bargaining leverage. These smaller countries would then aim to 
manipulate the perceived competition to influence the strategic influence of the larger 
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powers in a way that best advances their own. Ultimately, the U.S. needs to focus its 
energies on restoring the legitimacy of its “soft power”. It is submitted that making this 
the principal goal of U.S. policy in East Asia will prove to be more beneficial for 
enlisting China’s cooperation in other areas, such as nuclear proliferation. Reducing the 
centrality of regional military alliances will help weaken Chinese accusations that the 
U.S. is implementing a policy of confrontational containment that is hostile to China’s 
rise.   
Nuclear Proliferation: The Case of Iran 
Highlights of Strategy for Iran 
• Strengthen existing non-proliferation treaties and organizations 
• U.S. has to follow the rules itself, can’t go around making agreements with India 
and then expect China to cooperate with Iran 
 
 China’s strategic energy interests in Iran will make it very difficult to enlist 
China’s collaboration in dismantling Iran’s nuclear facilities in the same way the U.S. did 
with North Korea. This does not mean, however, that it is impossible. Those existing 
policy recommendations advocating that the U.S. should convince China of the need for 
its cooperation on this issue because “it is a vital component of our mutual confidence 
and our bilateral relationship”, do not address the present realities of this relationship.186 
Even as a rhetorical tactic this suggestion would fail to yield any results. It depicts the 
type of unbalanced representation of power in the relationship that inspires such antipathy 
from China’s leaders. Hypothetically speaking, were the circumstances reversed, and the 
country in question was Saudi Arabia and China was appealing to the U.S. in the absence 
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of any concrete evidence to implement an aggressive series of sanctions to influence the 
Saudi government, it would be highly unlikely that the U.S. would react with the same 
type of responsive it is now expecting from China. Thus, any strategy on this matter must 
take into account China’s own interests and appeal to its leadership accordingly. 
The best strategy for securing China’s support would be one persuading Beijing 
that an Iran with nuclear capabilities at its disposal is not only a threat to U.S. national 
security interests, but to its own as well. The next President should draw on the lessons 
set forth by Kissinger in his negotiations with Zhou. This strategy would involve a 
similar pattern of tapping into the primary motivations shaping China’s national interests 
and portraying a nuclear Iran as a clear threat to the advancement of those interests. In 
collaboration with their E.U. counterparts, U.S. diplomats should vividly illustrate the 
clear threat a nuclear powered Iran would pose to the stability of the entire region in light 
of the recent turmoil in Pakistan, which is threatening to revitalize its role as the most 
dangerous place in the world. A strong argument can be made that Iran’s nuclear 
capabilities would inspire proliferation across the region. Although this outcome is not 
guaranteed, what is certain is that the anxieties surrounding this possibility will be 
enough to disturb flow of investments to the region and send oil prices through the roof. 
Such dramatic increases to the price of oil would have a debilitating impact on China’s 
growth rate in spite of any energy benefits it strategic ties to Iran yield.  
However, the recently declassified U.S. intelligence report citing inconsistencies 
in the CIA’s representation of Iran’s nuclear capabilities greatly limits the effectiveness 
of this strategy. Presenting Zhou with clear intelligence of Soviet expansionism along the 
Chinese border was key to he success of Kissinger’s strategy. Given this reality, it is my 
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recommendation that should then U.S. move to strengthen the existing non-proliferation 
organization and treaties to deter future efforts from Iran to acquire a weapon. This 
means that the U.S. must also abide by these regulations. When the U.S. makes an ex 
parte decision to operate outside the rules set forth by the non-proliferation institutions it 
has the effect of undermining their authority and gives other powers an excuse to do the 
same. The United States’ effort to establish bilateral nuclear deals with India, which is 
not a legitimately sanctioned nuclear power, is a case in point. What is preventing China 
from making a similar deal with Iran? If the United States continues to fragment the 
international order into a series of bilateral alliances operating outside of the standard 
international institutions it runs the risk of inspiring China to do the same. A greater 
consequence of these actions would be recreating the mistrust and inclination towards 
misinterpretation that dominated the bi-polar world order of the Cold War.  
The Debate over Intervention in Sudan: 
Highlights for Collaboration on Sudan 
• Sudan wants Western aid, China wants to stop being castigated for its dealings 
with the Sudanese government, U.S. wants to stop violence in Darfur; there is a 
major incentive for collaboration on this issue 
• China can work behind scenes with Sudanese government while U.S. works 
together with U.N. Security council to draft a cease fire agreement that is linked 
to increased aid from the West if certain conditions are met 
 
 
 There are new developments indicating that Chinese behavior is yielding to the 
demands of the international community on this issue.  A recent New York Times Article 
cited noticeable changes in China’s strict position of non-intervention towards Sudan 
regarding the on-going genocide in Darfur. It has urged the government of Sudan to 
accept the largest peacekeeping force in addition to sending engineers to help 
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peacekeepers in Darfur.187 Although China is unlikely to cut of is business ties to the 
Sudanese government, this change in attitude is telling of a greater willingness to 
cooperate with the international community by becoming a more “responsible” power. It 
provides a brighter prospect for the framework of U.S. Chinese relations by supporting 
and image of China as a partner instead of an adversary.  
 The article cites that the Sudanese government places high political capital on 
reaching some sort of agreement that would open business and diplomatic contacts with 
the United States. Sudan wishes to expose itself to Western aid by engaging with the U.S. 
This is a major departure point for increased collaboration between the U.S. and China. 
Working together within the apparatus of the U.N. Security Council, China and the U.S. 
could work together to negotiate a cease-fire agreement linking the termination of the war 
in Darfur to increased exposure to the West. China could use its influence over the 
government to accept the terms of such an agreement.  Subsequently, this approach 
would be in China’s best interest. The international backlash that has come as a result of 
Beijing’s ties to Sudan is having negative effects on its reputation. With the Olympics 
rapidly approaching it is offsetting the leadership’s efforts promote a responsible 
character to the international community. 
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Energy Security: Deterring a Resource War 
Highlights for Collaboration on Energy Security 
• U.S. must lead by example on this issue, next President should focus heavy on a 
clean energy policy to help restore U.S.’s leadership role in the world 
• U.S. needs to work independently and with China to invest and promote research 
for “clean” coal burning technology and solar power energy, U.S. needs to get out 
of the Middle East 
• Seek to promote China’s integration into International Energy Agency, will 
impose more standards that will help to limit China’s growing appetite and 
consumption 
• U.S. needs to exercise active diplomacy to persuade China that reducing oil-
dependence is in both their long term interests and a BIG incentive for 
collaboration 
• To reassure suspicions of containment U.S. needs to make it clear to China that it 
doesn’t want to contain China’s access to oil supply lines 
 
 The disputes surrounding the cases of Iran and Sudan would be less likely to 
occur in the advent of more effective energy policies. Soaring demands for energy 
supplies support the claim that the only way the U.S. will be able to avoid a strategic 
rivalry with China in the future is through the development of such policies. Additionally, 
the current level of energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions is having 
debilitating effects on the environment. On this point, once again the U.S. must lead by 
example. If the U.S. chooses to restore its faltering global authority, leadership on energy 
policy will prove to be the most promising venue. The U.S. should work independently as 
well as with China to invest and promote research that would develop “clean” coal 
burning technology and solar power to liberate itself from its dependence on the volatile 
oil producing regimes in the Middle East.188 To enlist greater cooperation from China the 
                                                 
188 When considering the recommended sources of alternative energy, hydrogen power is 
the most promising because its source is abundant and free. In the competition between 
China and the U.S. to secure a productive edge in areas of high skill manufacturing the 
strategic advantage will, to a large extent, be determined by which country continues to 
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U.S. should supplement its annually occurring bilateral Energy Security Dialogues with a 
greater effort to integrate China into the multilateral dialogues among oil-consuming 
nations, which would include eventual membership into the International Energy Agency 
(IEA).189 The U.S. must exercise a persistent effort to persuade China that reducing its 
dependence on oil is in its long-term interest, while taking steps to reduce its own 
dependence. In the absence of an alternative energy policy, China and the U.S. must be 
careful not to impede upon what each considers critical supply lines of each other’s 
energy. The U.S. must clearly articulate to China that so long as peace ensues between 
the two nations, the United States will not attempt to contain China’s access to oil 
markets.190 In turn, this will help clarify U.S. policy to China’s leadership and reassure it 
against suspicions of containment in this arena. However, as the demand for energy 
increases against a declining supply this will become increasingly difficult, therefore it is 
better to rigorously pursue a renewable alternative.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
develop high-technology in the area of renewable energy. The most useful example of 
this is hydrogen cell technology for cars. Furthermore, in order to limit China’s 
competitive advantage in this area of industrial production, the U.S. should be a leader in 
pushing for common standards regulating the environmental effects of such technologies 
in the next round of amendments to the Kyoto Treaty. 
189 Hills, Carla A. et al., “U.S.-China Relations: An Affirmative Agenda, A Responsible 
Course” Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force Report 
No. 59 (New York, New York; The Council on Foreign Relations, 2007) Stable URL: 
http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/ChinaTaskForce.pdf (accessed 
March 9, 2008). P. 95 
190 Bader, Jeffrey A. et al, 2007.  “Contending with the Rise of China: Build on Three 
Decades of Progress”. Opportunity 08: A Project of the Brookings Institutions (pp. 1-15) 
Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution. p 5 
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Human Rights 
Highlights on Human Rights 
• Problematic to articulate clear policy on this issue, not considered an area of 
“high” national interest, and when there are other more contentious points in the 
relationship U.S. needs to be careful not to provoke conflict it 
• But U.S. should continue to push for a freer society but from a distance 
• When voicing opposition don’t be self-righteous or use excessive public 
condemnations to express outrage 
• In this circumstances do it in collaboration with the E.U. and organizations such 
as Freedom House 
 
Addressing the disputes over human rights is difficult because of the high level of 
Chinese sensitivities surrounding the issue. The U.S. must be careful not to directly 
interfere in what China considers an internal affair. Therefore, any specific 
recommendations for this policy area are difficult to establish because situations of 
human rights abuses are generally assessed on a case-by-case basis. Nevertheless, it 
should remain a primary objective of U.S. policy to encourage China to accept greater 
respect for human rights in accordance with international norms. A freer Chinese society 
is more likely to sustain a commitment to the current international system.  
That being said our efforts to inspire greater human rights reform should be less 
self-righteous and moralistic and more pragmatic. In situations of human rights abuses 
that do merit public condemnation the U.S. should seek to voice these concerns in 
collaboration with other Western powers, such as the E.U., and international 
organizations such as Freedom House. Presenting such opposition in the forum of a broad 
coalition reduces the possibility of creating a U.S. versus China dynamic.  It eliminates 
the Chinese resentments that accompany traditional unilateral approach of American 
interference. The less inclined Chinese citizens are to resent foreign power the more 
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likely they are to notice the grievances of their own domestic conditions and push for 
reform. Ultimately, the United States needs to lead by example on this issue.191It cannot 
expect China to adhere to standards of international law that U.S. officials choose to 
disregard themselves. Closing the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay would be one 
first important step in this right direction. When the U.S. chooses to vocalize its 
opposition to Beijing’s violation of human rights standards, it should be done in unison 
with an affirmative coalition behind it. The next administration should only resort to 
unilateral sanctions or public shaming in the most extreme circumstances. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
191 Ibid 13 
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CHAPTER 5: 
 
Conclusion: Updating U.S. Foreign 
Policy to the Twenty-First Century 
 
 
China’s emergence as an economic and geopolitical force in the global 
community is lined with both opportunities and challenges for the United States. The 
ability to recognize and readily distinguish the two requires that U.S. foreign policy be 
based on more realistic and balanced assessments of China’s capabilities and objectives. 
Contrary to public opinion, an increase in China’s capabilities and global prestige is not 
the cause of what many have observed as a period of decline in U.S. global power. Much 
of this damage is self-inflicted rather then some premeditated plot on the part of Beijing 
to challenge the U.S. for its hegemonic power. Continuing to interpret China’s rise in 
such fatalistic and emotional terms will limit our abilities to understand and prepare for 
the real challenges it presents to the future of this country. Such exaggerated fears and 
flawed perceptions of China’s power “trigger our Cold War reflexes.”192 Too much 
emphasis is placed on China’s “hard” capabilities, particularly its expanding military 
                                                 
192 Shirk, Susan L. China: Fragile Superpower. New York: Oxford University Press, 
2007.  P. 267 
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program and its massive export markets, as the source of its growing influence in 
geopolitics. Thus, in the U.S.’s efforts to “hedge” against the risks of a potentially 
adversarial China, its methods are still rooted in the Cold War relics of the twentieth 
century. These tactics are outdated and will prove ineffective in dealing with those 
challenges arising from the present conditions of the international system.  
The geopolitical landscape of the twenty-first century is already showing signs 
that it will be much different than the previous one. China is not the Soviet Union and the 
United States no longer generates the affective loyalty it once did as the defender and 
champion of liberal democracy. Globalization has created a complex web of 
interdependent economic and geopolitical relationships that render the fragmented order 
of the Cold War almost counterintuitive. Competition for power and influence in the 
global community continues, but the dominion of war has changed. The weapon of 
choice is no longer massive militaries and surplus reserves of missiles. These have been 
supplanted by large sums of liquidated capital and skills in areas of high technology. 
Both of these valuable assets are at China’s disposal.  
Additionally, globalization is demanding a higher level of multilateralism in the 
diplomatic exchanges among states. In his essay, Waving Goodbye to Hegemony, Parag 
Khana argues that globalization is making emerging market countries of the developing 
“second world” a new force in global politics because of their access to the stated 
capabilities of growing importance in this young century.193 Additionally, many of these 
                                                 
193 Khana, Parag. “Waving Goodbye to Hegemony”. In New York Times Magazine; 
January 27, 2008.  
***By Khana’s definition of “second world” he includes the BRIC countries outlined in 
Chapter 1, but also other countries such as Turkey and Libya. Although he only mentions 
them in passing, important to note among these rising powers are those of the United 
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countries are becoming “hubs for all oil, timber, manufacturing and services, and airlines 
and infrastructure, making them an attractive partner for the existing “great powers” of 
the U.S. and the E. U.”194 As a result, these newly rising countries are presenting 
themselves as an important consumer market for the world. China is at the forefront of 
these countries. But the volume of its economy, the unprecedented capital of its surplus 
foreign currency reserves, and its expanding military capabilities allow it to compete with 
the E.U. and the U.S., in spite of its developing status. As a result of their newfound 
power, these rising countries are demanding more balanced and reciprocal relationships 
with the existing “great powers”. The Bush Administration has effortlessly failed to 
capture these trends. It outwardly rejects more constructive approaches of mutual 
accommodation, stubbornly insisting that such tactics would “embolden the enemy”. 
Instead, the Bush Doctrine of preemption and unilateralism seeks to advance U.S. 
interests by coercively imposing our system of values on the world. In reality, however, 
this style of foreign policy has made the world more hostile to the advancement of such 
interests by alienating the U.S. from its allies and further antagonizing its adversaries. 
Khana notes: 
The self-deluding universalism of the American imperium — that the world 
inherently needs a single leader and that American liberal ideology must be 
accepted as the basis of global order — has paradoxically resulted in America 
quickly becoming an ever-lonelier superpower.195
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Arab Emirates, namely Dubai and Abu Dhabi. This is not only because of the growing 
capital and influence from the investments of their Sovereign Wealth Funds abroad. In 
my own experience, after visiting Dubai and confronted with the rapid pace of innovation 
in high technology as seen in the form of groundbreaking architecture and infrastructure, 
leads me to believe that such models are the way of the future. My visit to Hong Kong in 
December further confirmed these suspicions that modernity is on and Eastward path.  
194 Ibid 
195 Ibid 
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Contrary to a majority opinion, these new trends among rising states are not the result of 
China’s rise. Instead, they are a product of the liberal capitalist system, institutionalized 
by the United States after World War II. China’s advantage over the U.S. stems, not only 
from its surplus cash, but also its ability to operate within the scope of this new 
landscape, while the United States has yet to upgrade its policies to the realities of this 
century.  
 This advantage is most clearly reflected in the race to secure natural resources, 
what has been branded the “strategic competition of this century”. It is my conviction, 
that the Bush Administration is prolonging our involvement in an unnecessary and 
imperialistic war in Iraq to secure a lasting base in the Middle East for the purpose of 
safeguarding our oil interests and bolstering our regional influence in the face of an 
increasingly hostile Iran. As the Republican candidate for the presidency, Sen. John 
McCain’s pledges to advance this goal, serves only to confirm my suspicions. The war in 
Iraq, however, has delivered neither a more stable source of oil nor greater democratic 
freedoms for the Iraqi people as promised. Instead, it has tarnished America’s reputation 
and left our economy vulnerable as a result of reckless spending on the current account 
deficit, at a time when the U.S. should be saving and investing. Although China’s 
currency may be undervalued, this type of spending has contributed significantly to the 
current trade surplus it holds with the U.S. 
China’s approach is proving to be more successful. It has been able to secure its 
supply lines by saving and investing in countries rich in natural resources, instead of 
launching preemptive strikes.196 Beijing builds up its diplomatic capital with these 
                                                 
196 Ibid 
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nations by providing funds for the development of infrastructure, and in certain cases 
selling weapons to the government. While its involvement with and arms sales to certain 
clients may be morally questionable, its methods are not. In its own region, as illustrated 
in chapter four, China’s influence is steadily gaining on that of the United States. At a 
time when the U.S. is closing its doors to foreigners and erecting fences to keep out 
immigrants, China is keeping them open and investing in the development of poorer 
countries, and making multilateralism the cornerstone of its diplomacy.  
To understand the success of this strategy, and its growing popularity over 
exercises of military prowess to secure global and regional influence, one need only to 
look at the E.U.’s implementation of this method along its boarders. In 2004, the E.U. 
adopted the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) to provide greater financial and 
technical assistance to its neighbors. Under this policy, the exact terms of this assistance 
vary for each country and are set forth in a jointly negotiated Action Plan by the E.U. and 
the recipient country. The level of the ENP’s success as a means to advance the policy’s 
stated objective, “to establish a mutual commitment to the values of democracy between 
the E.U.and its participating neighbors,” is debatable.197 Still, it is significant to mention 
nonetheless, because of the broader implications this approach holds. When taken 
together, policies such as the ENP and China’s “smile diplomacy”, suggest a shift in the 
nature of power relations among the major states in the international system. In the so-
called competition for primacy and influence among the great powers, the traditional 
ranking of those capabilities, namely economic and military, relative to a given state’s 
power are being restructured. Approaches that emphasize “money and ideas” are being 
                                                 
197 Bretherton, Charlotte; Vogler, John. The European Union as a Global Actor. 2nd ed. 
New York: Routledge, 2006. 
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used to increase a state’s international power, while the more coercive elements of “guns” 
are secondary.198 To further illustrate this point one should consider the billions of dollars 
Abu Dhabi and Singapore’s sovereign wealth funds invested in Citigroup and Merrill 
Lynch. After suffering unprecedented losses from the recent credit crunch, the capital 
investments from such funds helped to keep the U.S. investment banking system from 
going under.   
 If the U.S. wishes to compete and engage with China in the twenty-first century, it 
must play close attention to these developing trends. Our military capabilities will 
continue to give the U.S. a formidable advantage over China. But if that is not how the 
competition for power and influence is being fought, then what good is it? Building up 
our “hard capabilities” should be second to restoring our “soft power” in the world. In 
this regard, China’s surplus reserve give it a sizeable advantage over the U.S. Yet, the 
United States is still a strong force in global politics and will be for a long time to come. 
Its markets are the gateway to Western investments and trade. In addition, its institutions 
of higher education and research facilities are still the best in the world. This makes it 
attractive to many of the “second world” countries that are critical outlets for U.S. 
investment and production.  
In an effort to restore the U.S.’s leadership role, or at least reverse the damage of 
the last eight years, the next President should follow the lessons set forth by Nixon and 
Kissinger in their approach to China. When Nixon took office, the U.S.’s ability to 
compete was limited by its involvement in Vietnam and a weakened economic position 
                                                 
198 Lampton, David M. “What Growing Chinese Power Means for America”; Prepared 
for: United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; Hearing On: “The 
Emergence of China Throughout Asia: Security and Economic Consequences for the 
U.S.” The East Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee, June 7, 2005. P. 4 
 135
as a result of excessive military spending. Recognizing these limitations on America’s 
material capabilities, they sought to bolster the U.S.’s power and influence through 
renewed alliances, that although unbalanced, relied on more constructive elements of 
engagement.  
The necessity for collaboration requires that our exchanges with other nations, 
including China, be based on the “art of relating states to each other by agreement rather 
than by the exercise of force, by the representation of a ground of action” reconciling 
“particular aspirations with a general consensus. Because diplomacy depends on 
persuasion and not the imposition of force.”199 In each of the approaches outlined in 
China and the E.U.’s policies,during the course of diplomatic exchanges with their 
neighbors, there is a greater preference for multilateralism over the unilateral imposition 
of demands. The next U.S Administration should capitalize on this trend. In its conduct 
of foreign policy, there should be a greater premium placed on multilateralism. 
Accordingly, the there should be an initiative to restructure the existing international 
institutions and government organizations to allow for countries like China, Brazil and 
India to have a bigger leadership role in these forums and the outcome of its decisions, 
and by virtue of this fact, increase their stake in the continuity and stability of the system. 
This will require both sacrifice, reflected in a willingness to surrender the U.S.’s 
traditional role as the world’s sole leader and patience, to allow for methods of mutual 
accommodation to deliver results. Unfortunately, sacrifice and patience are both virtues 
that are foreign to the United States. Nevertheless, stubborn adherence to failed policies 
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of unilateralism will only continue to marginalize the role and influence of the U.S. in 
international relations.  
This approach is best served in the U.S.’s relationship with China. The growing 
hazards of a degraded environment, the challenges of global terrorism, and the three digit 
prices for oil, all provide tremendous opportunities and incentive for increased 
collaboration, despite the challenges a rising China may present. However, the basic 
realities of its political system, coupled with significant disparities in cultural norms, 
account for fundamental incompatibilities in the domestic experiences of China and the 
United States. As a result, there exists more room for the type of misperceptions and 
mutual suspicions that breed conflicts in the international system. To bridge this gap in 
experience and allow for increased cooperation, the “hard” power of the markets as a 
form of integration, will have to be supplemented with a greater level of diplomatic 
exchanges falling outside the scope trade and commerce issues.  
The U.S. should adjust its policy of engagement to factor in the reality that China 
is no longer a substantially weaker power. Thus, engaging will need to be based on 
advancing mutual interests rather than exercising force through sanctions to bend China’s 
interest to meet those of the U.S. In areas where these diverge, China has repeatedly 
demonstrated that it is more responsive to addressing competing interests in a multilateral 
forum. In order to make progress on the outstanding disputes highlighted in this thesis, 
U.S. policymakers will have to recognize this aspect of Chinese behavior to allow for 
more successful diplomacy with Beijing. 
 As the existing great power, the U.S. will play a significant role in shaping the future 
of this century. If America chooses to adopt a more constructive approach towards China 
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that silences the inflated fears circling the rising titan’s future trajectory, the risks of 
facing China as a rival will be significantly reduced. This will result in greater 
opportunities for partnership. Yet, if the U.S. continues to “hedge” against this risk 
unilaterally and in ways that cater to China’s historic fear of encirclement,allowing for 
the powerful forces of Chinese nationalism to “nurture its fantasies [and] cherish its 
hates”, the prospects for peace and stability in this century will be limited.200 At this 
critical juncture in U.S.-China relations, the truth Nixon spoke more than thirty-five years 
agois relevant now more than ever:  
 
United States Policy is not likely…to have much impact on China’s behavior…But it is 
certainly in our interest, and in the interest of peace and stability in Asia and the world, 
that we take what steps we can toward improved practical relations with Peking…We 
will seek to promote understandings which can establish a new pattern of mutually 
beneficial actions.201
 
Ultimately, there will need to be a greater willingness to collaborate with our allies and a 
return to pragmatism and flexibility in U.S. foreign policy, that will secure not only a 
positive future course for U.S.-China relations, but also America’s ability to successfully 
adapt to the new realities of the international system and its changing role in the world. 
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China’s Membership in Multilateral Treaties and Organizations 
 
INTERNATIONAL 
Economic Security 
World Trade Organization (WTO) United Nations Security Council 
World Bank Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
**not a member but contributes 
regularly to aid packages Chemical Weapons Convention 
 Nuclear Suppliers Group 
 Missile Technology Control Regime 
 
 
REGIONAL 
 
Economic Security 
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 
ASEAN Plus Three  
Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX II: 
TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT 
 139
Relevant Sections 
 
SECTION 1. This Act may be cited as the "Taiwan Relations Act".FINDINGS AND 
DECLARATION OF POLICYSEC. 2. (a) The President- having terminated 
governmental relations between the United States and the governing authorities on 
Taiwan recognized by the United States as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 
1979, the Congress finds that the enactment of this Act is necessary--(1) to help 
maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific; and (2) to promote 
the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing the continuation of commercial, 
cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people 
on Taiwan.(b) It is the policy of the United States-- (1) to preserve and promote 
extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations between the 
people of the United States and the people on Taiwan, as well as the people on the 
China mainland and all other peoples of the Western Pacific area;(2) to declare 
that peace and stability in the area are in the political, security, and economic 
interests of the United States, and are matters of international concern;(3) to 
make clear that the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the 
People's Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will 
be determined by peaceful means;(4) to consider any effort to determine the 
future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, 
a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern 
to the United States; (5) to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; 
and (6) to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force 
or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or 
economic system, of the people on Taiwan. (c) Nothing contained in this Act shall 
contravene the interest of the United States in human rights, especially with respect 
to the human rights of all the approximately eighteen million inhabitants of Taiwan. 
The preservation and enhancement of the human rights of all the people on Taiwan 
are hereby reaffirmed as objectives of the United States. IMPLEMENTATION OF 
UNITED STATES POLICY WITH REGARD TO TAIWANSEC. 3. (a) In furtherance of 
the policy set forth in section 2 of this Act, the United States will make available to 
Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be 
necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.(b) 
The President and the Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such 
defense articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the needs of 
Taiwan, in accordance with procedures established by law. Such determination of 
Taiwan's defense needs shall include review by United States military authorities in 
connection with recommendations to the President and the Congress.(c) The 
President is directed to inform the Congress promptly of any threat to the security or 
the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan and any danger to the 
interests of the United States arising therefrom. The President and the Congress 
shall determine, in accordance with constitutional processes, appropriate action by 
the United States in response to any such danger. 
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